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Will Zuzak; katriuk991130.html; 1999-11-30
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Return
CRITIQUE by Will Zuzak; November 1999
of
Judge Marc Nadon Denaturalization Verdict re Vladimir Katriuk
Date: 19990129; Docket: T-2409-96

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PREFACE

2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Holocaust Industry
2.2 Denaturalization and Deportation
2.3 Old Boy's Club
2.4 Summation of Katriuk Case

3. SUMMARY OF VERDICT (Links)
3.1 INDICTMENT [1] - [2]
3.2 FACTS [3] - [35]
3.3 LUCIENNE ROBILLARD'S POSITION [36] - [38]
3.4 COLLABORATION; ATROCITIES [39] - [73]
3.5 FAILURE TO DIVULGE CIRCUMSTANCES [74] - [125]
3.5.1 DOCUMENTS [74] - [111]
3.5.2 RCMP SECURITY AND VISA CONTROL OFFICERS [112] - [120]
3.5.3 DEFENSE TESTIMONY [121] - [125]
3.6 SUMMARY AND FINDINGS [126] - [154]
3.7 FOOTNOTES 1 - 19


1. PREFACE:

This CRITIQUE arises from a discussion of the denaturalization and deportation (hereafter d/d) issue with Vladimir and Maria Katriuk on Oct. 14, 1999, while on a trip to Montreal. They were shocked and devastated by the January 29, 1999, decision of Judge Marc Nadon that Mr. Katriuk be denaturalized. After hearing their story and reading Judge Nadon's Verdict, so were we.

Our interest in the war crimes issue dates back to the Deschenes Commission (1984f) and the never-ending John Demjanjuk saga (1975f). Some of our writings in these areas are archived in the Demjanjuk Files at
http://meltingpot.fortunecity.com/pakistan/83/
Of particular relevance are the critiques of the Deschenes Commission Report (DESCHENE.005) and the Wiseman Report (DEMANUK.011).

This particular document is archived as katriuk991130.html; whereas the original Nadon Verdict is katriuk990129.html. In order to allow the reader to relate to the original text of Judge Nadon, we retain the original section markings from [1] to [154] in square brackets. For the sake of brevity, most of the text associated with legal arguments and references to judicial decisions have been deleted. Also, a section referring to German military action against Communist partisans in Belarus has been deleted.

We have taken the liberty of correcting a number of spelling errors and inconsistencies: Belarus (Byelorussia); Belarusian village Evye (Yewa); Ukrainian cities of Kyiv (Kiev), Chernivtsi (Chernovsty), Pleshchenitsi, etc.; Maria Kawun (Kavoom).

In most places throughout the text, we have replaced the impersonal "the respondent" terminology with the name "Mr. Katriuk". Secondly, in order to emphasize the personal responsibility of the various politicians responsible for these political show trials, we have replaced the impersonal "the Minister" with real names such as Anne McLellan, Lucienne Robillard, etc. The names of the Ministers responsible for this travesty of justice are:
Justice and Attorney General: Alan Rock, Anne McLellan
Immigration and Citizenship: Sergio Marchi, Lucienne Robillard, (Elinor Caplan)
Solicitor General: Herb Gray, Andy Scott, Lawrence MacAulay

This Critique is not a politically correct document. We introduce and use terminology such as the Holocaust Industry (a term first used by Britain's late Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits many years ago) and Old Boy's Club to more accurately reflect the forces we believe are at play in the d/d issue. In doing so, we mean no disrespect for the millions who suffered and died (including nine million Ukrainians) in the Holocaust, nor for the thousands of Canadians who fought and died (for every Canadian that died, 200 Ukrainians died) defending the British Empire. For those that are offended by our use of these terms, we apologize in advance.

In the Introduction, we summarize the evolution of the d/d issue and the contents of the Verdict, often providing clickable links to items therein. Throughout the text of the Verdict itself, we insert (often snide and sarcastic) comments and information in square brackets [] and in the color Fuchsia. This should allow the reader to quickly differentiate between our comments and the original text.

Enjoy.

Will Zuzak; 1999-11-30


2. INTRODUCTION:

2.1 Holocaust Industry

The concept of denaturalization and deportartion (d/d) was developed by the Holocaust Industry and implemented by the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in the United States commencing in 1979, specifically to deal with "Nazi war criminals" allegedly residing in that country. One of their earliest victims was John Demjanjuk, who had the misfortune to have a man of questionable integrity, Frank Battisti, presiding as judge. It has since been ruled that the OSI perpetrated fraud on the court in obtaining Mr. Demjanjuk's denaturalization in 1981 and extradition to Israel in 1986.

Early in the 1980s, the Holocaust Industry shifted its attention to Canada via Robert Kaplan, Solicitor General in the Trudeau Liberal cabinet, who kept trying to place war crimes on the government agenda. Their big breakthrough came with the election of the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney in 1984, who knuckled under to the Holocaust Industry and promptly established the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, headed by Justice Jules Deschenes. Within three years, the Deschenes Commission Report was tabled (30 Dec. 1986), the government loudly proclaimed that it had opted for the made-in-Canada solution of criminal trials rather than d/d, the appropriate legislation was passed and the Canadian War Crimes Unit was set up.

Unfortunately for the Holocaust Industry, and fortunately for the accused victims, a fundamental problem arose. Despite all the hand-waving and innuendos of the prosecution, the juries could not be convinced that the accused victims had perpetrated any crimes. There was simply no evidence! Although individual judges and individual members of the legal profession may be rather easily corrupted, a 12 person jury, no matter how simple-minded, can usually maintain its integrity and human decency. War crimes prosecutions came to a screeching halt.

The next big opportunity for the Holocaust Industry came with the re-election of the Liberals of Jean Chretien. By 1995, the Holocaust Industry had corrupted Justice Minister, Alan Rock, and Citizenship and Immigration Minister, Sergio Marchi, to abandon criminal trials and switch to the d/d formula. This was carried out by the Old Boy's Club against the express decision of the Canadian Parliament in 1987. Except the British Old Boy's Club of the 1940s has now been augmented by the addition of the French and of the Holocaust Industry.

Since 1995, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice have been Alan Rock and Anne McLellan, the Solicitor General, responsible for the RCMP, have been Herb Gray, Andy Scott, and Lawrence MacAulay and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration have been Sergio Marchi, Lucienne Robillard and Elinor Caplan. In addition to Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, these are the politicians most directly responsible for instituting d/d.

2.2 Denaturalization and Deportation

An excellent overview of d/d in the Canadian context is given on pages 168 to 243 of the Deschenes Commission Report. (It is interesting that in this whole section, the term "collaborators" only appears once (p.182), and the term "collaboration" also only once (p. 220)). Indeed, the legal argumentation of the Judge Nadon Verdict below, appears to be a selective rehash of the material submitted and/or referred to in this section.

To illustrate the blatant hypocrisy of the tenets of d/d, we reproduce the memos of Christopher Amerasinghe (now chief prosecutor of the Canadian War Crimes Unit) dated May 27 and Sept. 30, 1983 [ibid., p. 215]:

However, if we were to prove that the Immigration application forms were in existence, and if we can call evidence, as we can, of former Immigration officers who implemented immigration policies in Germany shortly after the war, that any person declaring membership in the Nazi Party or employment in the various organizations would have been automatically rejected it would be possible to establish on a balance of probabilities that the individual concerned lied on his Immigration Application Form in order to obtain admission to Canada.

(...)

However, as a broad general principle the worst case that we could have is a case where there was no Immigration Application Form signed by the person but proof of landing in Canada only. In such a case it is my view that it should still be possible to establish on a balance of probabilities that the person gained admission to Canada by suppressing material facts, and/or by fraud and/or by false representations, and that he was not lawfully admitted to Canada and that therefore he did not fulfill the requirements necessary to obtain Canadian citizenship.

It is my view that if the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities then it may well be possible for the Crown to discharge its onus without having to actually produce the application forms signed by the immigrant concerned but rather rely on a specimen form together with the testimony of an immigration officer stationed at the particular place where the immigrant was processed at the particular time. If on the other hand the standard of proof is held to be that which prevails in the United States of America namely, "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that does not leave the issue in doubt" I doubt that the Crown would be able to establish its case.

The opposing view is illustrated in a Dec. 8, 1983, memo of Attorney General, Mark MacGuigan, to Solicitor General, Robert Kaplan [ibid., p. 216]:

All of these arguments would be based by the Crown on the assumption that every RCMP officer did what he was supposed to do in every single case, without exception. Courts may be reluctant to infer fraud on the basis of this type of evidence, particularly in cases which reach back almost 40 years.
...
The Court would then be confronted with a conflict between the Crown's evidence of general practice and the suspect's direct evidence of what was said or not said in a specific case. The latter type of evidence, if given with any degree of credibility, is ordinarily more persuasive to a judge, particularly where the judge is being asked to make a finding of fraud.

Mr. MacGuigan's reasonable reservations were obviously ignored.

That Mr. Amerasinghe's drivel be written by a member of the legal profession and, furthermore, that it be given credence by other members of the Justice Department and politicians responsible for the administration of justice and protecting the rights of Canadians is simply incredible. The intent is to bypass justice and convict the accused victim on some technicality.

Let us look at the first paragraph, written in 1983, long after "membership in the Nazi Party or employment in the various organizations" had been lifted as a cause prohibiting immigration. Whether the individual concerned lied or not becomes irrelevant. The appropriate analogy would be a Jewish person claiming to be of Aryan descent to avoid incarceration during the war, being denaturalized and deported today for having lied to the German authorities.

The second and third paragraphs are even more relevant, because the situation outlined there applies directly to the situation of Mr. Katriuk. There is no Immigration Application Form, but there is proof of landing. However, contrary to Mr. Amerasinghe's stipulation as a requirement, there is no testimony of the immigration officer stationed in Paris in 1951, who filled out Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk's immigration application form. The key terminology here is "on the balance of probabilities", which, I submit, has no place in our justice system dealing with war crimes. For the assignment of a probability in these cases is a subjective decision, as so well illustrated by Judge Nadon in his Katriuk Verdict. What Judge Nadon considers as probable, most people would consider as improbable. And it certainly has nothing to do with what actually occurred.

The implications of accepting "on the balance of probabilities" as one of the tenets of our criminal justice system are horrendous. It would encourage further deterioration of our society and our justice system. For what was once rigorous and sure as required by "proof beyond a reasonable doubt", becomes a confusing mixture of possibly, perhaps and maybe. It would encourage false charges, false evidence and innuendo in our Courts. It could also camouflage deliberate corruption of the personnel within the justice system.

As proponents of the d/d policy, the Holocaust Industry argues that denaturalization is a civil proceeding which is not restricted to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" and in which "on the balance of probabilities" may be utilized. Our position is that even the concept of denaturalization should be eradicated from the face of the planet. And it certainly should not be a civil proceeding. Citizenship is too precious to be gambled on a subjective "balance of probabilities" decision of a single judge.

Furthermore, the Canadian War Crimes Unit was specifically set up to handle criminal acts during periods of war. To now resort to the civil proceeding of denaturalization is an admission that its creation was a mistake, that its existence is superfluous and that it should be disbanded immediately.

The Katriuk case is a perfect example of my contention (Ukrainian News, Oct. 6-19, 1999) that d/d is a blueprint for injustice:

There can be no doubt that these civil proceedings constitute a major violation of the civil liberties of the accused victim. No evidence of individual criminality is required. The victim is accused of lying during his immigration procedures, an accusation, which also cannot be proven. In essence, the outcome of the trial depends on whether the judge believes the prosecution's contention that at a hypothetical immigration hearing, a hypothetical security officer asked a hypothetical question to which the accused did not answer truthfully.

2.3 Old Boy's Club

During the glory days of the British Empire, the men who ran it would gather in their private clubs and refer to each other as "Old Boy". Despite the trappings of democracy and parliamentary debate, it was the members of the Old Boy's Club, who made the real decisions and held the real power.

The documents listed by Judge Nadon in the Verdict, as well as those in the Deschenes Commission Report, illustrate that this is a valid description of the situation concerning immigration to Canada following WWII. All the decisions were made via orders-in-council, cabinet directives and verbal instructions. There is no reference to any parliamentary debates or statutes on the immigration issue.

As far as we can ascertain from the names listed therein, all the people involved were from the British or French ethnic groups. These were the ubermenschen of the day. Immigration from these ethnic groups was relatively easy, even if they were criminals or collaborators. Even Germans were soon placed in the favored category. However, for refugees from Eastern Europe, especially those of Slavic origin, the hurdles were placed much higher. First, there was a general antipathy toward these people in Canada as suitable immigrants. Secondly, there was the fear of Communist infiltration as revealed by the Gouzenko affair. Thirdly, there was incessant propaganda by the KGB and the Holocaust Industry that these people were war criminals and collaborators.

This attitude seems to have survived to the present day.

2.4 Summation of Katriuk Case

Vladimir Katriuk was born Oct. 1, 1921, in the village of Luzhany, (now) Ukraine. In November/December 1941 he was with a group of Ukrainian Nationalists who unfurled a Ukrainian flag in Kyiv. They were arrested by the Germans, the leaders shot, and he was given the option of being sent to Germany as a forced laborer or joining the Schutzmannschaften police units. He joined the police unit and ended up guarding a flour mill in Kyiv against Communist saboteurs for about one year and guarding a Polish village in Belarus against partisans for another year. There is no evidence that he committed atrocities at either of these locations.

In 1944, his unit was transferred to France to fight against the Western Allies. His unit deserted and joined the French partisans. They fought with the French army against the Germans for several weeks until a Soviet repatriation commission arrived and demanded that these people be returned to the Soviet Union. When they refused, they were interned by the French and given the choice of either returning to the Soviet Union or joining the French Foreign Legion (FFL).

Mr Katriuk joined the FFL and once again fought against the Germans, was wounded, spent 2 months in an American military hospital, and fought once again with the Western Allies until the end of the war. The French military presented him with a medal and supporting documents for his service and bravery.

He was prepared to go to Indochina with the FFL, but because of his virulent anti-communist views got into a fight with his Spanish Communist commanding officer, who promised him that he would not return alive from Vietnam. He deserted and went back to the French partisans, who prepared false documents for him under the name of Nicolas Schpirka. With these documents he obtained his ID papers from the French authorities, found work, got married to Maria Kawun in 1948, and opened a delicatessen shop in Paris.

After receiving an invitation from friends, the Rohosky's, to immigrate to Montreal, they applied at the Canadian Consulate in Paris in 1951 to immigrate to Canada under the name of Schpirka. According to their testimony, they made three visits to the Consulate: the first visit to obtain information, the second visit to fill out the forms, the third visit to have X-rays taken. Both Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk testified that during their second visit, an employee at the Canadian Consulate in Paris filled out the immigration application form on their behalf. Mr. Katriuk insists that the employee did not ask him any specific questions about his wartime activities.

There is no record of any of these visits, nor of the immigration application form, nor of the name of the employee in question, nor of the procedures carried out at the Canadian Consulate in Paris in 1951.

They arrived aboard the steamship, Nelly, in Quebec City on Aug. 14, 1951 and a record of their landing under the name Schpirka exists. They continued to the Rohosky's in Montreal the next day and started their life in Canada. After five years of residency, they decided to acquire their Canadian citizenship, but they wanted to revert to their correct name, Vladimir and Maria Katriuk.

In 1957, they went to their priest, who took them to a lawyer, Paul Masse, who inquired at the Department of Citizenship and Immigration as to the best course to follow, who, in turn, instructed Mr. Masse that they should apply to the Department for a name change before applying for citizenship. On Oct. 17, 1957, Mr. Masse sent in the requested affidavit and in a letter dated May 13, 1958, the Department informed Mr. Masse that their request had been granted and that the name in their dossiers had been changed to Vladimir and Maria Katriuk. On May 20, 1958, the Katriuk's applied for their citizenship which was granted on Nov. 10, 1958, in a citizenship ceremony before Judge Robitaille, who was fully aware of the name change.

We emphasize that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk applied for the name change completely openly and in good faith. They could very easily have lived the rest of their lives under the name of Schpirka.

Presumably, Mr. Katriuk's name arose during the Deschenes Commission hearings in 1985-86. Mr. Katriuk relates that the Soviet KGB visited his sisters and brother in Ukraine in the early 1980s (during the Brezhnev era). They were very rude and threatening and kept demanding a picture of Mr. Katriuk (which they did not have). There was a second, more respectful, visit during the Gorbachev era requesting information and a picture. It is my understanding that documents in Ottawa archives relating to the circumstances leading to charges against Mr. Katriuk have been made secret for a period of 25 years.

Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk were shocked when they received a letter dated August 15, 1996 from the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Lucienne Robillard) announcing intention to revoke Mr. Katriuk's citizenship. On August 27, 1999, Mr. Katriuk referred the case to the Federal Court of Canada (Judge Marc Nadon). In his Verdict, Judge Nadon does not reveal the dates of the trial, but he does refer to taking evidence from Savaliy Khrenov in Nizhniy Novgorod, Russian Federation on March 30, 1998.

We will not repeat the form-letter-type blanket condemnation of Mr. Katriuk by the prosecution. Judge Nadon concedes that there is no evidence that Mr. Katriuk committed atrocities or that he "voluntarily" joined the police units. However, he seems to emphasize the two terms "collaborator" and "use of false or fictitious name" as relevant issues. After a great deal of mental gymnastics, he concludes "that Mr. Katriuk was not lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence" and rules that Mr. Katriuk "obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation, or fraud or by concealing material circumstances".

In the text of the Verdict below, we reject much of Judge Nadon's convoluted reasoning. We leave it to the reader to study the case and reach his own conclusions.


3. SUMMARY OF VERDICT:

3.1 INDICTMENT:
Sections [1] - [2]

3.2 FACTS:
Sections [3] - [35] outline Mr. Katriuk's life history from about 1940 to 1958. Our comments can be found following sections [4], [5], [6], [9], [14], [17], [18], [29], [33], [34], [35].

3.3 LUCIENNE ROBILLARD'S POSITION:
Sections [36] - [38] outline the charges against Mr. Katriuk, which we have deleted for the most part because of the legal jargon and repetition. We have, however, made comments in [36].

3.4 COLLABORATION WITH GERMANY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF ATROCITIES:
Sections [39] - [73] essentially present the testimony of two paid professional witnesses for the Holocaust Industry, Frank Golczewski and Manfred Messerschmidt, as to the events during the war. There is also testimony taken in the Russian Federation of Savaliy Khrenov, who was a colleague of Mr. Katriuk in Ukraine, Belarus and France.

Our comments are appended following sections [39], [42], [43], [46], [49], [51], [52], [64], [65], [73].
Of particular relevance is our dissertation on the term collaborator after section [73].

3.5 FAILURE TO DIVULGE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES UPON APPLYING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN CANADA IN 1951:
We divide sections [74] - [125] into 3 sub-sections:

3.5.1 DOCUMENTS sections [74] - [111], where Judge Nadon lists all the documents related to immigration procedures following WWII, which support his verdict. Since we do not have access to the trial transcripts and exhibit numbers are not given, we do not know if these sections truly represent the exhibits submitted by the prosecution and defence, or whether they have been specifically culled to support Judge Nadon's Verdict.

We have taken the liberty of inserting other information in the chronological order to give the reader a broader insight into the sociological realities of the time.

Relevant comments are associated with sections [75], [76], [79], [80], [82], [85], [87], [88], [89], [91], [94], [95], [96], [98], [99], [101], [103], [104], [105], [107], [108], [110], [111].

3.5.2 RCMP SECURITY AND VISA CONTROL OFFICERS sections [112] - [120], which includes the rather self-serving testimony of three RCMP security screening officers and three visa control officers.

Relevant comments are associated with sections [112], [115], [116], [117], [118], [119].

3.5.3 DEFENSE TESTIMONY sections [121] - [125], which include the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk, as well as that of Ivan Serbyn and George Hiltschuk, who were colleagues of Mr Katriuk in Ukraine, France and Canada. To get a general feel for the conditions prevailing at that time, the reader is encouraged to read these sections starting at [121].

Our standard comment is to ask whether Judge Nadon feels that Mrs. Katriuk, Mr. Serbyn and Mr. Hiltschuk should all be denaturalized and deported.

3.6 SUMMARY AND FINDINGS:
Sections [126] - [154] are where Judge Nadon presents his complicated web of reasoning to come to his unjust Verdict. We take great exception to many of his findings. Legal material associated with Brooks in sections [146] - [149], presumably lifted from the Deschenes Commission Hearings, has been deleted.

Relevant comments are associated with sections [126], [127], [128], [129], [130], [131], [132], [133], [134], [135], [136], [138], [139], [140], [141], [142], [143], [144], [145], [150], [151].

3.7 FOOTNOTES There are also comments associated with footnotes 3 and 18.

In reading over the material, the reader is urged to try to ascertain whether Marc Nadon's unjust Verdict is a result of influence of the Holocaust Industry, the Old Boy's Club, a personal antipathy towards Mr. Katriuk, a lack of mental capability, or any other reason the reader can fathom. But, of course, this determination must be done on a balance of probabilities.


3.1 INDICTMENT:
Date: 19990129
Docket: T-2409-96

BETWEEN:
    THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION (Lucienne Robillard)
    Applicant

    - and -

    VLADIMIR KATRIUK
    Respondent

    REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NADON J.:

[1]    On August 15, 1996, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Lucienne Robillard) gave notice to Vladimir Katriuk, a Canadian Citizen, that it was her intention to request that the Governor in Council revoke his citizenship.

"... on the grounds that you have been admitted to Canada for permanent residence and have obtained Canadian citizenship by false representations or fraud ..."

[2]    On August 27, 1996, Mr. Katriuk, pursuant to paragraph 18.1(a) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 29, as amended, wrote to the Minister [Lucienne Robillard] requesting that she refer the matter of the revocation of his citizenship to the Federal Court of Canada. On October 31, 1996, the Attorney General [Alan Rock] of Canada, on behalf of the Lucienne Robillard, referred the matter to this [Federal] Court [of Canada]. By his proceedings, the Attorney General [Alan Rock] seeks a declaration from this Court that Mr. Katriuk obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.

3.2
FACTS:
[3]     Mr. Katriuk is of Ukrainian ancestry. He was born on October 1, 1921 in the Village of Luzhany, near the City of Chernivtsi...situated in an area known as Bukovina which was then part of Romania.

[4]    After completing Grade 6, Mr.Katriuk commenced an apprenticeship in the meat packing trade in Chernivtsi for a period of three years (1935 to 1938). For the next two and one half years, he worked in a meat factory returning to his village shortly before the arrival of troops from the Soviet Union in 1940. The Soviet troops arrived to occupy Bukovina following the pact entered into between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939. The Soviet occupation lasted until Germany invaded the newly created regions of the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Shortly thereafter, German troops arrived in Bukovina with their Hungarian and Romanian allies.

{4} [Judge Nadon fails to mention that during this "Soviet" occupation, the NKVD arrested thousands of people suspected of opposing the Soviet regime. These were tortured and either shot outright or sent to Siberia with or "without" the right of correspondence. (Those "without the right of correspondence" were later identified as occupants of mass graves which dotted the Carpathian landscape.) Following the German attack on June 22, 1941, in a final fit of vengeance before escaping to the east, the NKVD massacred thousands of Ukrainians being held in the various prisons throughout Western Ukraine .]

[5]    Neither the Soviet nor the German occupation was pleasant for the local Ukranian inhabitants. Professor Orest Subtelny in Ukraine A History, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), at 453, offers a vivid description of the plight of the Ukrainians during that period:
             It seemed, as Europe moved toward the Second World War, that Ukrainians had little to lose from the radical changes that it promised to bring. Still traumatized by Stalinist excesses and the increasing Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian repression in the western regions, Ukrainians had reasons to believe that any change - even that brought on by war - would favorably alter the conditions under which they lived. But those who thought so would be sadly mistaken, for although the war radically transformed the situation of Ukrainians, their plight changed from bad to worse. The collapse of Poland at the outset of the war led to the imposition in Western Ukraine of the even-more-repressive Soviet regime. But when the German invaders swept away the Soviets, they brought with them a Nazi regime that in Ukraine reached the heights of brutality and inhumanity. Caught between the Nazi and Soviet regimes and lacking, for all practical purposes, a state to protect their interests, Ukrainians were especially vulnerable to the devastation of the war and the ruthless policies of its totalitarian protagonists.             

             The War in Ukraine: Phase One             

From the Ukrainian point of view, the Second World War took place in two [three] distinct phases. The initial phase began on 1 September 1938 [1939] when the Germans attacked Poland and the Soviets occupied its eastern territories soon after. The main feature of this stage, which involved only the West Ukrainians, was the appearance in their lands of new occupying powers, the foremost of these being the Soviets [Russians]. The second phase, which will be discussed later, commenced with the German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941 and lasted until the Soviet expulsion of German troops from Ukraine in the fall of 1944. This phase encompassed all of Ukraine and exposed its inhabitants to the worst horrors of the war.

{5} [Judge Nadon fails to mention the even more terrifying third phase. These were the SMERSH/MVD units following in the wake of the advancing Red Army - - arresting, torturing, shooting anyone even suspected of opposing the Soviet regime and terrorizing the population into submission. It is estimated that during this phase, the repression of the inhabitants approached 60% in Estonia, 40% in Latvia and 28% in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.]

[It is also the era of Ilya Ehrenberg and Vasili Grossman, of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, travelling the countryside looking for evidence of atrocities against Jews. It was a symbiotic relationship made in hell. The Zionists needed atrocity stories to attract world sympathy for the creation of the forthcoming Israeli state. The Communist NKVD was delighted to torture suspected Ukrainian nationalists to confess to imagined atrocities and sign documents in a vain effort to stop the torture.]

[6]    In the fall of 1941, Mr. Katriuk, like many of his Ukrainian compatriots from Bukovina, joined a volunteer force which marched to Kyiv to, amongst other things, liberate that city, and hence liberate Ukraine. The march to Kyiv took a number of months. The Bukovinians arrived in Kyiv in November or December of 1941. In due course, the Germans who were occupying Kyiv, after a brief period of coexistence with Ukrainian nationalists, decided that Ukrainian nationalism would not be tolerated in the occupied territories. As a result, many of the leaders of the Ukrainian National Movement were either arrested or executed.

{6} [Judge Nadon is presumably referring to OUN-M (followers of Melnyk, as opposed to Bandera). According to Mr. Katriuk, the whole unit was interned, the officers were shot and the rank and file were given the option of either becoming Ostarbeiter (slave labour in Germany) or joining the Schutzmannshaft (police guard units). Mr. Katriuk chose the latter, where his duty was to guard a flour mill in the vicinity of Kyiv against sabotage by Communist partisans.]

[7]    The Germans then proceeded to form battalions in which different nationals, including Ukrainians, would serve Germany. The first battalion to be formed was Battalion 115, of which Mr. Katriuk became a member. All members of Battalion 115 were Ukrainians. Subsequently, before the end of 1942, the Germans formed Battalion 118. Approximately 100 men from Battalion 115, including Mr. Katriuk, were taken to form Battalion 118. The third company of Battalion 115 became the first company of Battalion 118. Prisoners of war captured by the Germans from the retreating Soviet armies were also recruited into this battalion. They became the second and third companies of Battalion 118. The Battalion was formed of about 500 men divided between three companies each of which was divided into three platoons. In turn, each platoon was composed of a number of units of ten to thirteen men. Mr. Katriuk was a member of the first platoon of the first company of Battalion 118 and was made a sergeant in charge of a unit. Battalion 118 was led by Ukrainian officers under the overall command of German officers.

[8]    At the end of 1942, the men of Battalion 118 were taken in trucks to the City of Minsk in Belarus. From Minsk, the battalion was sent to Pleshchenitsi. Following its stay in Pleshchenitsi, the battalion went to Evye, a Polish village, where the battalion remained for approximately one year, i.e. from the spring of 1943 to the time of the Russian advance in the spring of 1944.

[9]    With respect to the battalion"s activities while in Kyiv, Minsk, Pleshchenitsi and Evye, Mr. Katriuk, in his statement filed in response to the Minister"s summary of facts and evidence, gave the following explanation:
             13.     Mr. Katriuk was placed on guard duties in Kyiv as were his colleagues, with Mr. Katriuk recalling his particular responsibility to guard a wheat mill producing flour in Kyiv. At this time there was a great deal of sabotage and partisan activity by Soviet forces that had not all of them retreated with the general collapse of the front before the German invasion.             

             17.     In Belarus, Mr. Katriuk's particular company was sent for a period of some months to Pleshchenitsi to maintain law and order and eventually Mr. Katriuk's company was sent to the location of Evye.             

20.     Mr. Katriuk's responsibilities while posted at Evye for a period of some one year were to protect villagers and their livestock and their resources from a threatening array of partisan forces, such being right-wing Polish partisans, and left-wing Polish partisans, and Belarusian partisans, and Soviet partisans, all of which partisan groups had one need and activity in common, namely, raiding villages to secure foodstuffs in order for their own survival and continued activity.

{9} [Judge Nadon fails to explain that these Polish Nationalists, Polish Communists, Belarusian Nationalists and Russian Communists were bitter enemies -- often more interested in fighting each other rather than the Germans. The Polish Nationalists wanted to ensure that the area remained under Polish control at the end of the war, whereas the Belarusian Nationalists were fighting for an independent Belarus. Both the Polish and Russian Communists wished to impose Soviet hegemony on the region. And Judge Nadon does not even mention the Jewish partisans, who had an agenda of their own.]

[In Ukraine, the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and the Red (Russian Communist) partisans were locked in a life and death struggle. The KGB had sent the Reds into Ukrainian territory specifically to fight Ukrainian nationalism. Their goal was to infiltrate the UPA and cause dissension amongst the Ukrainian ranks and populace. The favorite tactic of the Red partisans was to assassinate some irrelevant German functionary, for which the Germans would execute 50 Ukrainian civilians in reprisal. Certainly, they were war criminals of the worst sort.]

[10]    In his viva voce evidence, Mr. Katriuk reiterated the above statements. He testified that he had never participated in any major military operation and that he had never fired his gun in Pleshchenitsi and Evye. Mr. Katriuk's testimony was that his company"s involvement was to protect civilians against enemy partisans. Mr. Katriuk stated that he had heard of German operations which took place in 1943 but that his company had not participated in these operations.

[11]    As the Russian army advanced in the Spring of 1944, the German troops, including Battalions 115 and 118, began their retreat towards the West. At some point during the retreat, i.e. somewhere in what was then East Prussia, Battalions 115 and 118 were merged into one battalion. According to Mr. Katriuk, the newly created battalion [#62] would have had approximately 500 to 600 men.

[12]    In August of 1944, the men of the new battalion were transported by train to Bésançon, France. From there, they were taken to Valderharn, a small village where German anti-aircraft forces were stationed in large barracks built during Napoleon"s rule. The members of the new battalion were informed by their German officers that they would now be part of the Waffen S.S. 30th Grenadier Division.

[13]    Following their arrival at Valderharn, some members of the new battalion made contact with the French underground and, in particular, with what was then known as the Forces Françaises de l"Intérieur ("FFI"). One day, Mr. Katriuk and his companions were informed by German officers that they would be fighting the allies on the following day. According to Mr. Katriuk, he and his companions were waiting for an opportunity to join the French underground and, consequently, that evening, a majority of the men of the battalion defected to the French partisans.

[14]    As part of the FFI, Mr. Katriuk and his colleagues fought on a number of occasions against German troops. They were, in due course, sent to the front to fight against Germany. While they were fighting at the front, Soviet officers came to visit them with a request that they return to the "motherland". Mr. Katriuk did not want to return to Russia as he feared he would be sent to Siberia for a long period of time. As a result of Soviet pressure, Mr. Katriuk and his colleagues were removed from the front and sent to the village of Dumblair where they remained for a few days. Their weapons were taken from them and the French informed them they would have to return to Russia. After discussing the matter with French officers, they were informed that the only way they could avoid being sent back to Russia was to join the French Foreign Legion ("FFL"). Mr. Katriuk joined the FFL as did many of his colleagues.

{14} [Judge Nadon fails to examine the relevance of this episode. What was a Soviet Repatriation Commission doing in France even before the end of the war? Why would they object to Ukrainians fighting with the Western Allies against the Germans? (Earlier, Stalin had complained bitterly that the Western Allies were deliberately delaying establishment of the Western Front so as to maximize casualties on the Eastern Front.) Why would the French even contemplate acceding to their demands? The answer is that the Western Allies and the French underground were very heavily infiltrated by Soviet espionage. The Red Orchestra, led by Leopold Trepper, was in full rehearsal in Paris.]

[The Red Terror in the East had followed the Ukrainians to France. Later, in the DP camps, the refugees were under constant pressure from this Terror until they managed to emigrate to Canada, the United States, Australia, etc. They were free at last! Or so they thought. It is bitterly ironic, that this Terror now manifests itself in the likes of Marc Nadon, Lucienne Robillard and Anne McLellan.]

[15]    Mr. Katriuk was taken by train to Marseille in order to enroll in the FFL. According to Mr. Katriuk, 100 to 120 men of the merged battalions decided to return to the Soviet Union.

[16]    Mr. Katriuk officially joined the FFL in September 1944 as a private. He was one of twenty to twenty-five "volunteers" who were asked by their French commanders to go to the front to fight the German army. At the front, Mr. Katriuk was placed in charge of a machine gun and, during the course of his participation, was severely injured. He spent two and one half months in an American hospital in France.

[17]    In 1945, Mr. Katriuk again fought with the allies, this time at the Italian front near Monaco. It was during this period of time that the Second World War came to an end. Mr. Katriuk was taken from Italy to Nice, France where he rested and was then taken to barracks near Paris (at Meaux) where FFL troops were to be reorganized so as to be sent to Indochina.

{17} [Judge Nadon fails to mention that the French military awarded him with a medal and a certificate attesting to his service and bravery.]

[18]    At Meaux, Mr. Katriuk fell under the command of a Spanish sergeant. His relationship with his commanding officer was very poor and, as a result, his commanding officer informed him that it was doubtful that he would return alive from Indochina were he would shortly be sent.

{18} [According to Mr. Katriuk, after a bloody fist fight with his Communist antagonist, the sergeant promised him that he would not return alive from Vietnam.]

[19]    This threat occurred about three days before the 15th of July 1945 parade to commemorate the liberation of Paris. Mr. Katriuk was given a month"s leave and he travelled to Paris and, while there, contacted members of the French underground that he had met during the war. He informed them of his problem with his commanding officer in the FFL and asked for new identity papers in the name of Nicolas Schpirka, his brother-in-law. At that time, his sister and brother-in-law were still living in Mr. Katriuk's home village in Bukovina. Mr. Katriuk's evidence is that he changed his name because he had deserted the FFL and, if caught, would have been shot. The papers which Mr. Katriuk obtained showed his birth date to be January 1921 instead of October 1921. He chose January as his birth month because his brother-in-law was born in the month of January. It took several months before Mr. Katriuk obtained his papers in the name of Schpirka. Needless to say, Mr. Katriuk did not return to the FFL at the end of his leave.

[20]    Mr. Katriuk took his new identity papers to the municipality of Paris and was issued a "carte d"invité" valid for three months. In due course, his "carte d"invité" was renewed for a period of ten years. He then started looking for a job and found one as a butcher for a small company where he worked for approximately ten months. Mr. Katriuk then found a better paying job, again as a butcher, and remained at this new job for approximately two years following which he and two partners started a business.

[21]    One of his partners was a Frenchman that he had met at his second job and together they found a third partner, an Ukrainian from Bukovina, Ivan Serbyn. Their business was a wholesale delicatessen operation, selling headcheese, hams, sausages, etc.. At one point in time, the business had eighteen employees. Because of French laws, neither Mr. Serbyn, nor Mr. Katriuk, as foreigners, could own the business and therefore their wives were the legal owners.

[22]    Mr. Katriuk met his future wife at the end of 1945 or in the early months of 1946. Maria Stéphanie Kawun, a French citizen, lived in Paris in the 6e Arrondissement. She was born in Troyes, France on February 3, 1927. Her parents were Ukrainians who had immigrated to France in 1924. Mr. Katriuk and his wife were married in Paris on February 10, 1948. Maria Stéphanie Kawun became Maria Stéphanie Schpirka.

[23]    Although the Schpirkas had no particular reason to come to Canada, they decided to take steps to come to this country after receiving a letter of invitation from Mr. and Mrs. Rohosky, Ukrainian friends whom they had met in Paris and who had immigrated to Canada. The Rohoskys had come to France from Switzerland. In their letter of invitation, the Rohoskys informed the Schpirkas that there were a large number of Ukrainians living in Canada and that the Province of Quebec was French speaking.

[24]    Before the Schpirkas decided to take steps to see whether they could immigrate to Canada, Ivan Serbyn informed his partners that he was immigrating to Canada and, as a result, sold them his interest in the business. Sometime in the spring of 1951, Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka took the Rohosky letter to the Canadian consulate to find out whether they could immigrate to Canada. Mr. Katriuk does not remember much of the immigration process which led to his obtaining a visa. He does not remember being asked anything specific at the Canadian Consulate. He testified that he never filled out nor signed any form. He remembers seeing a doctor who asked that he have x-rays taken. He also remembers meeting an immigration officer with whom he spoke in French. Mr. Katriuk stated categorically that he was never interviewed and that he attended the Consulate on two or three occasions. Mr. Katriuk denies having been asked what he did between 1938 and 1945.

[25]    Within a matter of months, the Schpirkas obtained their Canadian visas. The Schpirkas boarded the ship NELLY at the port of Le Havre on August 6, 1951 and arrived in Quebec city on August 14, 1951. The following day, the Schpirkas proceeded to Montreal by train where they arrived at Windsor Station. The Schpirkas then took a taxi to the Rohosky residence situated in the Montreal district of Rosemont. According to Mr. Katriuk, he did not see nor was he interviewed by immigration officers upon arrival in Quebec City.

[26]    Within a matter of weeks, Nicolas Schpirka had found a job. Initially, he attempted to find a job with Canada Packers but was refused because he could not speak English. Shortly thereafter he found a job with Frontenac Packing where he was paid $0.90 per hour. He worked 40 hours a week. He then found what he considered a well-paying job at $56.00 a week. He subsequently worked with Drash H. Kosher Meats and with Hygrade where he spent his days inside a freezer. Mr. Schpirka started having problems with his legs and his doctor advised him to leave his job at Hygrade if he "wanted to walk on his feet".

[27]    As a result, Mr. Schpirka decided to help his wife, a hairdresser, who had recently opened a beauty salon. Also, Mr. Schpirka began cultivating bees on a farm owned by one of his friends. When his friend sold the farm, Mr. Schpirka bought his own farm.

[28]    In Canada, Mr. Schpirka frequented the Church of St Sophie, an Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Montreal. In 1957, Mr. Schpirka confided in his priest [Rev. Slusar] that his real name was Katriuk and that he wanted to revert to his true name. Rev. Slusar advised him to see a lawyer and suggested that he see Me Paul Massé, Q.C.. Rev. Slusar took Schpirka to see Me Massé. After having related to Me Massé the events which led him to change his name, Mr. Schpirka asked Me Massé what could be done to enable him to change his name back to Katriuk. Mr. Katriuk did not give Me Massé any information concerning his activities prior to his arrival in France in 1944.

[29]    Me Massé, after inquiring with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (the "Department"), informed Nicolas Schpirka that the easiest way would be for him to apply to the Department for a name change before filing his application for Canadian citizenship.

{29} [As implied in section [35] below, Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk officially applied for the name change on October 17, 1957, and Mr. Masse had contacted the Department much earlier. We estimate that approximately 18 months transpired between the initial inquiry and the granting of citizenship on Nov. 10, 1958. Surely, extensive checks were made in the interim? This is the only reasonable explanation for the delay, if the Immigration Department ran as efficiently and smoothly as Judge Nadon insists. Or were the the Immigration officers still as harried and overworked as they had been during the heyday of DP immigration during the early 1950s?]

[30]    On May 20, 1958, Vladimir Katriuk and his wife signed applications for citizenship under the name of Katriuk which the Department received on May 26, 1958. In his application, Mr. Katriuk stated that he was born in Luzhany, Romania (Ukraine), that he was a Romanian citizen and that his ethnic origin was Ukrainian. He further indicated that he had entered Canada under a false name, namely Nicolas Schpirka, and had arrived in Canada on August 14, 1951 on the steamship NELLY. He further indicated the following:
Avant la fin de la 2e guerre mondiale, j"ai quitté les rangs de la LÉGION ÉTRANGÈRE de France sous les nom et prénom "Nicolas Schpirka" Ref. le dossier ED-2-37194, Immigration, Montréal. Mes nom et prénom véritables sont "VLADIMIR KATRIUK".

[31]    On October 10, 1958, the registrar of Canadian Citizenship, Mr. J.E. Duggan, wrote to the Chief, Admission Division, Immigration Branch, in the following terms:
                 Applications for Canadian citizenship have been filed by the above-named under Section 10(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act with the Clerk of the Citizenship Court, Montreal, Quebec, May 20, 1958.             

                 Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk were lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence August 8, 1951, under the names of Maria Stephanie Schpirka and Nicolas Schpirka. They now state that their correct names are Marie [sic] Stephanie and Vladimir Katriuk and refer to your file number ED-2-37194.             

    Would you please advise this office of the details surrounding the correct names of Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk and, if possible, may we have a photo-copy [sic] of any documents on your file relating to their correct names.

[32]    On October 17, 1958, the following reply was sent to the registrar of Canadian Citizenship:
             1.     This will acknowledge your memorandum dated October 10th, 1958.             

             2.     These persons entered Canada under the surname "Schpirka" at Quebec, P.Q. on August 14, 1951, and were granted landing under that surname. In 1957 they approached our Montreal office with a view to clarifying their Immigration status before applying for Canadian citizenship. In an affidavit sworn to at Montreal on October 18th, 1957, Vladimir Katriuk attested that he was born on October 10th [sic], 1921 at Lujany, Bukovina, Roumania, took refuge in France in 1944 and a few months later enlisted in the French Foreign Legion under his correct name Vladimir Katriuk. He further attested that he left the Foreign Legion without permission and obtained from the French government a travel document and identity certificate under the name of Nicholas [sic] Schpirka.             

             3.     We also have on file a supporting affidavit sworn to by Maria Katriuk in which she states that she married Vladimir Katriuk, then known by the name of Nicholas [sic] Schpirka, on February 10th, 1948. She states further that she and her husband came forward under the surname Schpirka.             

             4.     We have on file an extract of registry of birth at Troyes, France, on February 3rd, 1927 of Maria Stephanie Kawun, as well as an extract of the records of marriages, showing that Nicolas Schpirka and Marie [sic] Stephanie Kawun were married on February 10th, 1948 in Paris, France.             

5.     The application of Vladimir Katriuk and his wife Maria Stephanie for amendment of our records, was favourably considered and due notation has been made to indicate that Vladimir Katriuk and Maria Katriuk were granted landing (admitted for permanent residence) at Quebec, P.Q. on August 14th, 1951.

[33]    The Department, by a letter dated May 13, 1958, advised Me Massé that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk"s application to correct their names had been accepted. The letter reads as follows:
                 Je désire me référer à nouveau à la requête que vous avez soumise à ce bureau il y a déjà quelque temps de la part de vos clients, monsieur et madame Vladimir Katriuk, qui sont arrivés à Québec sur le vapeur "Nelly" le 14 août 1951 et qui ont été admis au pays sous des noms d"emprunt.             

                 A ce sujet, il me fait plaisir de vous informer que le Ministère, en vue des informations qui ont été soumises, a décidé d"autoriser la rectification désirée et les personnes mentionnées sont maintenant enregistrées dans les dossiers du Ministère sous leurs noms véritables, soit Vladimir et Marie[sic ] Katriuk.             

                 Veuillez agréer, cher monsieur Massé, l"expression de mes sentiments les plus dévoués.             

                             Le fonctionnaire supérieur à l"immigration             
                    Port de Montréal

{33} [Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk have the original of this letter, which we have reproduced as katriuk01.gif. It is thus not clear whether Judge Nadon obtained his copy of the letter from Mr. Katriuk or whether a copy was obtained from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

We emphasize that between Oct. 18, 1957, when Mr. Masse submitted the request for a name change, and May 13, 1958, when the Department granted the request, there was ample time for the Department to do background checks, which presumably they did.]

[34]    As appears from the above passage, the Department amended its records to indicate that Vladimir Katriuk and Maria Katriuk had been granted landing in Quebec City on August 14, 1951. As a result, Nicolas Schpirka and Maria Schpirka ceased to exist as far as the Department was concerned. This explains why Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk filed their applications for citizenship under their own names. On November 10, 1958, Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk became Canadian citizens.

{34} [According to the Katriuk's, the presiding Judge Robitaille welcomed them with the words (in French): "As of today Nicolas Schpirka is dead and buried. Maria Kawun Katriuk, you will get 2 photos and $5.00 so that you can have your citizenship cards." Their citizenship certificates are dated 17 Nov 1958.]

[35]    I should point out here that Mr. Katriuk"s affidavit sworn to in Montreal on October 18, 1957, to which the Department"s reply of October 17, 1958 refers at paragraph 2, is not part of the evidence.[WHY NOT?] I should also point out that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk"s, or, rather, Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka"s, applications for permanent residence in Canada are also not in evidence since the files were destroyed by the Department in the regular course of its business at the end of the 1950s or early 1960s. [Why should Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk suffer for this?]


{35} [SUMMARY: Mr. Katriuk's evidence outlined above appears reasonably straightforward. Once his military group, striving to proclaim an independent Ukraine in Kyiv, was interned in late 1941, Mr. Katriuk had little choice but to adapt to German realities. He guarded a wheat mill against sabotage in Kyiv for about a year and guarded a village in Belarus against partisan attacks for another. There is no evidence that he was involved in any atrocities at either location. When he was transfered to France in 1944, he defected, joined the French partisans, fought for the Western Allies against the Germans, was wounded, recovered and fought again until the end of the war.

To avoid being forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union, he joined the French Foreign Legion, got into a fight with his commanding officer, deserted, obtained false documents from the French partisans under the name of Schpirka, obtained ID cards, got married, worked, made application and immigrated to Canada in 1951 under the assumed name.

Before obtaining their Canadian citizenship, Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk openly revealed the predicament of their assumed names to their priest, to their lawyer and to the immigration and citizenship authorities. Everyone, including Judge Robitaille who welcomed them at the citizenship ceremonies, was fully aware of and approved the name change back to Katriuk.]

3.3
THE MINISTER"S POSITION:

[36]    In these proceedings, the Attorney General [Alan Rock and Anne McLellan], on behalf of the Minister [Lucienne Robillard], seeks a declaration from this Court that Mr. Katriuk obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.

[... material deleted ...]

             47.     At the time Mr. Katriuk applied for citizenship, good character and acquisition of Canadian domicile were both conditions precedent to being granted Canadian citizenship.             

[I would submit, that Mr. Katriuk is a person of outstandingly good character and he had, indeed, resided in Canada for seven years before obtaining citizenship.]

             48.     Mr. Katriuk presented himself to Canadian authorities as a person of good character, notwithstanding his activities during the Second World War, in particular his collaboration with the Nazi regime, and his participation in operations carried out by the Schutzmannschaften battalions and the Waffen-SS.             

{36} [It is the height of irony that Anne McLellan, of all people, would question the character of Mr. Katriuk. I would suggest that the above statement be reworded slightly to read as follows:
"Mr. Katriuk is recognized by Canadians as a person of exceptionally good character, as illustrated by his activities during the Second World War, in particular his striving for Ukrainian independence, his honourable participation in the Schutzmannschaften and Waffen-SS battalions when coerced to do so by the German regime, and by participation with the French partisans against the German army with such valor as to be awarded a medal for his bravery."]

[... material deleted ...]

[37]    It is therefore the Minister"s position that Mr. Katriuk was a "collaborator", that he participated in the commission of atrocities against the civilian population in Belarus while a member of Battalion 118, that he failed to divulge material circumstances upon applying for permanent residence in Canada in 1951, including his true identity, and finally that he failed to divulge material circumstances in 1958 when he applied for Canadian citizenship.

[... legal material deleted ...]

[38]    Before dealing with the Minister"s allegations, I would like to say a few words on the standard of proof applicable in these proceedings. Once again, I am in complete agreement with the statement of the law made by Mr. Justice McKeown in Bogutin at pages 27 to 29:

[... legal material deleted ...]


3.4
COLLABORATION WITH GERMANY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF ATROCITIES:

[39]    Mr. Katriuk admits that he was a member of Battalion 115 and, subsequently, of Battalion 118. However, Mr. Katriuk takes the position, and he testified to the effect that he did not voluntarily join the battalions. He testified that joining the battalions was the only alternative to deportation to Germany. In that regard, his evidence is corroborated by Ivan Serbyn and George Hiltschuk. Both Mr. Serbyn and Mr. Hiltschuk were Ukrainians from Bukovina who marched to Kyiv in the fall of 1941 and both became members of Battalion 118. Mr. Katriuk's evidence that he did not voluntarily join Battalion 118 was also corroborated by the evidence of Mr. Savaliy Antonovich Khrenov, whose evidence I took in Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia, on March 30, 1998. Mr. Khrenov was a soldier in the Red Army. He had been called for military service in April 1941. He was part of the Soviet troops that were sent to occupy part of Poland. After Germany invaded Poland, Mr. Khrenov"s unit retreated to Kyiv where, in November 1941, he was taken prisoner by the Germans. He was placed in a prisoners of war camp from which he escaped two months later. Although Mr. Khrenov was able to hide for a while, the Germans, on three occasions, tried to deport him to Germany. Each time, he managed to escape. This is what led him to join Battalion 118 in 1942. At one point during his cross-examination, when asked what alternative he had to joining Battalion 118, Mr. Khrenov gave the following answer:
The only faith [fate] that awaited me was a rope around the neck. That was the only choice left.2

{39} [One wonders how Anne McLellan's minions divined the existence of and location of Mr. Khrenov? Under what auspices did they arrange the interview? It is important to obtain the complete documentation in this regard.]

[40]    On the issue of collaboration and war crimes, the Minister filed the expert reports of Professors Dr. Frank Golczewski and Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt. I will begin with the report of Dr. Golczewski. He received a Ph.D. from Cologne University in 1973 and subsequently studied extensively in the areas of modern and East-European history. From 1983 to 1994, he taught modern history and, since 1994, he has been a full professor of East-European history at the University of Hamburg.

[41]    In his report dated August 3, 1997, Dr. Golczewski discusses the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Kyiv under German occupation until December 1941, the Bukovina Battalion, the formation of local militias and auxiliary units in Bukovina, Galicia and Ukraine in the summer and fall of 1941 and the conditions for the auxiliary formations in occupied Russia.

[42]    At pages 29 to 31 of his report, Professor Golczewski writes as follows:
             Schuma3 [Militia] service was voluntary. The German military police and Security police personnel screened the militiamen they took over and the newly enlisted ones. Periodic screenings took place, because the Germans were really afraid of communist infiltrators and later of OUN propagandists as well. Especially in sensitive duty - like guarding of important objects and anti-partisan warfare - political correctness was considered to be an important point. The fact alone that ?unreliable? people were dismissed implies that nobody was pressed into Militia service.             

             As early as November 1941 an order by the Rear Land Force area Commander South stated that the auxiliaries had to serve German aims only and should not acquire the imprint of a future Ukrainian army. The infiltration of OUN propagandists should be stopped. Dean documents that in the Berdy…iv area Militia members were arrested for being affiliated with OUN. When desertions to the partisans, especially to the nationalist partisans (UPA) formed in late 1942, occurred more frequently in later years the screening and checking of possible Militia personnel intensified. The need for more local auxiliaries which was motivated by the ?necessary economic use of German soldiers? led to the recruitment of more and more POWs.             

             This situation needs some explanation. As stated before, Ukrainian POWs were recruited for auxiliary formations as early as 1941. Their motivations might have differed from those of the formerly non-POW auxiliaries. From summer 1941 until the end of winter 1941/42 Soviet POWs faced almost certain death in the German POW camps. Not only were they denied Geneva Convention POW treatment, but starvation, dying from cold and illnesses and executions of those under suspicion of pro-communist leanings accounted for millions of deaths among them. In such conditions in order to survive one was highly tempted to join a collaborationist formation such as the Militia. The ?volunteerness? of POWs becomes a farce when viewed from the perspective of highly possible death.             

             In 1942 the fate of the Soviet POWs improved somewhat. Nevertheless, I consider POW recruitment not to be ?voluntary?. This does not apply to those who joined the Militia who were not POWs, however. The main source were in the beginning independently formed militias transformed into Militia. Recruitment thereafter had to concentrate on the local population the male part of which had been reduced by Red Army recruitments and evacuations. The remaining Ukrainian men were from 1942 on under constant danger of being deported to Germany as forced labour. Joining the Militia was therefore a way to escape these labour service round-ups.             

             This was, however, still a ?voluntary?. Though life as a labourer in Germany was far from desirable, it did not imply imminent death. Service in the Militia - especially anti-Partisan warfare - could be highly dangerous on the other hand. An additional incentive to join the Militia was of a material kind. With hunger a constant feature in the occupied USSR, joining the auxiliaries meant a regular supply of food for the policeman and his family. The confiscation of Jewish goods and other articles, when ?controlling? markets and travellers offered material supplies to corrupt Militia. As the expected and promised land privatization did not occur distinction in Militia service was declared to be a way to gain ground allocations prior to an overall settlement. Power was an additional aspect. The Germans declared that they were never short of willing people to join the Militia - even later in the war, when a German victory became more and more improbable.             

I know of no case where anybody would have been pressed into Militia service. If the ?volunteerness? of the personnel is put into question it is only possible by taking into account the personal reference frame of the volunteers. Not joining the Militia meant hunger and material dearth - on one level with the regular population. In contrast, for POWs only Militia service meant escape from imminent death. This was balanced, however, by the clear understanding that a victorious Soviet Union would consider those who joined enemy para-military or military service to be traitors subject to the death penalty.

In light of the above I come to the conclusion

-     that service in the auxiliary units was voluntary. Only former POWs escaped imminent death by joining auxiliary units. For the others different incentives were a reason to make the choice they did,

-     that an oath of allegiance was not required for SSPF (Schutzmannschaft) personnel before later in 1942,

-     that the auxiliaries were armed, though different waves of disarming then took place, and that the Bukovina Kure[frac12] is said to have started out unarmed.

{42} [The conclusion of Golczewski that service in the auxilliary units was voluntary is absurd. By definition, any country under occupation is under coercion. In Ukraine, the whole populace was dragooned to help the German war effort in one way or another. Note that Judge Nadon has already ruled that Mr. Katriuk and 3 others had joined the schutzmannschaft under coercion.]

[In the testimony of Mssrs. Golczewski and Messerschmidt below, we deliberately leave the terminology "the Respondent" and "R." to illustrate how completely these "paid professional experts for the Holocaust Industry" were incorporated into the prosecution team.]

[43]    At page 32 of his report, Professor Golczewski comments on Mr.Katriuk's statement in answer to the Minister"s summary of facts and evidence. Professor Golczewski writes:
As far as the paragraphs 4-84 in the Respondent"s statement are concerned I state in the light of the above that the statements in paras 4 and 5 are correct. Para 5 is only half-true. Though the OUN set out to bring full independence to Ukraine it did so in cooperation with the Germans who were considered to be ?liberators? and allies. That is why many Ukrainian nationalists endorsed the German atrocities towards the Jewish and Polish populations, seeing in these activities a step towards ?ethnic cleansing? of the desired Ukrainian territory. This was done, because the Germans on purpose tried to foster a ?liberator"s? image. So although the sovereignty in the end was planned to be ?independent of both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany? the OUN groups were allied with the Germans: the OUN-B until July/August 1941, the OUN-M - to which the units, with which the respondent was affiliated, belonged - in Kyiv until November/December 1941.

The Bukovinians arrived in Kyiv in September or early October 1941. It is not clear if they arrived in Kyiv right along with the German troops or some days later. Their later arrival would, however, not have been caused by the planting of mines, but by organizational priorities on the side of the OUN marching groups.

The statement of paras 8 and 95 is correct in the light of the available documentation. There is some doubt about the statement in para 106, as deportation for forced labour on a non-voluntary basis started only later in 1942. The reason given by Veryha (through only in the English summary) of his account is that the Bukovina men joined the 115th Battalion, ?not having any means by which to return to their native province of Bukovina, occupied by Roumanians?. This was not the only solution - it was a more expedient one.

{43} [Once again, Dr. Golczewski's argumentation is absurd. Even the testimony of Mr. Khrenov in section [39] contradicts his statements. The Germans had arrested the Ukrainians and shot their leaders for nationalist activity. It is inconceivable that the Germans would then let them go free to promote an independent Ukrainian state. As an alternative to continued incarceration or execution, the best way to keep them out of mischief is to send them to Germany as forced labour or to Belarus as schutzmannschaft personnel.]

[44]    I now turn to Dr. Messerschmidt"s evidence. Dr. Messerschmidt received a Ph.D. from the University of Freiburg in 1954. In 1958, he obtained a law degree from that university and a second degree in law from Stuttgart University in 1962. Since 1962, he has been employed by the Research Institute for military history in Freiburg. In 1970, he became Chief Historian and has been teaching history since then at the University of Freiburg.

[45]    In his report, Dr. Messerschmidt discusses the formation of the Auxiliary Police (Schutzmannschaften) by the Germans. The Auxiliary Police, of which Battalions 115 and 118 formed part of, were to be used, according to Dr. Messerschmidt, primarily for security and anti-partisan warfare in the occupied regions.

[46]    According to Dr. Messerschmidt, as the Ukrainians were categorized as anti-Polish and pro-German, they were to be provided with more food and given preference in the staffing of subordinate administrative positions. Thus, according to Dr. Messerschmidt, the better treatment accorded to Ukrainians made it possible to establish "voluntary units" of Auxiliary Police.

{46} [The Ukrainian Nationalists were neither anti-Polish or pro-German per se; they were simply pro-Ukrainian.]

[47]    At page 12 of his report, Dr. Messerschmidt poses the following question:
The question is whether there was force involved through coercion or the threat of deportation to forced labour in Germany.

[48]    Dr. Messerschmidt answers his question as follows:
    The forced recruitment for labour service in the Reich began only in 1942. Until then it was a matter of "attracting" people, although this was often done in a very drastic manner. Only in May of 1942, the Army High Command [OKH] demanded conditions for municipalities; through effective publicity measures by the mayors, the people should be made to understand what their duty was. However, residents were also pressed into service in the Army [Heer] Rear Area. Finally, the greatest number of forced labourers were recruited for service in the Reich in the summer of 1942, for the most part women who were employed in German households (about 800,000 Ukrainian women). These methods were continued in 1943. The "Reports from the Occupied Areas" ["Meldungen aus den besetzten Gebieten"], No. 54 of 14 May 1943) characteristically conclude: "In general it is found that no one can be motivated any longer to volunteer. However, since in certain places and areas, contingents for labourers were prescribed, one has no choice but to use force".

[49]    Later on, at page 14 of his report, he states:
The German side was aware that the prospect of a better life with the German troops was a major motive for prisoners of war. But this very circumstance shows that prisoners were not forced into collaborative service. This also would have run counter to the tendency of wanting only "reliable" prisoners.

{49} [The "prospect of a better life"? The prospect of ANY life! Of the millions of Red Army soldiers captured in 1941, about 85% perished.]

[50]    With respect to the participation of Ukrainians in the Auxiliary Police, Dr. Messerschmidt opines as follows at pages 17 and 18 of his report:
In Ukraine, the General Commissar ordered a recruitment campaign for the auxiliary forces [Schutzmannschaften] on 24 February 1942. The following conditions were established for membership:

    1.     Age: 18-45
    2.     Full physical suitability
    3.     Minimum height: 1.65 m
    4.     Appropriate general education
    5.     Good reputation (to be established by means of official certificates and witnesses).
    6.     Commitment initially only until 31.12.1942.

Special mention should be made of the Ukrainian units from which a large percentage of officers and men transferred into the Ukrainian Militia battalions. From the German point of view, these legions that had been organized for an independent Ukraine, certainly represented an anti-Bolshevist potential which could be utilized for police purposes, provided that the primary nationalist interests could be repressed. This goal was not realized with all, but with very many it could be subordinated to the struggle against Bolshevism. It would be difficult to find another explanation for the fact that the transfer was generally achieved without many problems.

According to a memorandum by the Commander of the Order Police for Ostland of 13.3.1942, the recruitment of volunteers had the effect that skilled workers were leaving their jobs to join the auxiliaries [Schutzmannschaften]. In Latvia (according to Event Report [Ereignismeldung] USSR No. 187) 8000 volunteers had applied by 30 March 1942. Volunteers were also recruited for the Lithuanian auxiliaries [Schutzmannschaften].

The general rules also provided that members of the Schutzmannschaften could file an application for discharge.

[51]    After these comments, Dr. Messerschmidt then turns his attention to Militia Battalions 115 and 118 and Mr. Katriuk's participation, on a voluntary basis, in these battalions. At pages 18 and 19, Dr. Messerschmidt writes the following:
Both battalions belonged to the area of Higher SS and Police Leader Russia South and Ukraine. For battalions in this area, the numbers 101 to 200 had been allocated.) It was thus determined that the bulk of the members were to be Ukrainians. The occupying power proceeded accordingly in Kyiv when the battalions were set up.

The question is to what extent the prescribed volunteer principle was indeed maintained.

V. Katriuk (the Respondent will hitherto be referred to as R) has claimed that he was enlisted [eingestellt] after his arrival in Kyiv (November or December 1941) and indicated that this was his only alternative, i.e. to deportation for slave labour in the Reich. He claims that soon after, Battalion 118 was formed from prisoners of war who also had the alternative to be brutally treated and to starve in the prisoner of war camp. The respondent says that he had been transferred with his company into Battalion 118. In this manner, he says, the Germans had tried to suppress the nationalist feelings of the Schutzmannschaften and that this was how they had treated the "volunteers". He says that an oath of solidarity had therefore not been requested either.

R. bases his claim that he did not join Battalion 115 voluntarily on two arguments:
    1.     the threat of forced labour in the Reich,
    2.     the claim that the prisoners of war who joined Battalion 118 had no choice other than death by starvation in the prisoner of war camp.

He describes the overall situation as if Battalions 115 and 118 had been purely compulsory units [Zwangseinrichtungen].

The above indications concerning the German policy in terms of Ukrainian nationalism speak against R"s claim. Neither does the implication hold true that the Bukovina Ukrainians in November/early December 1941 were given the alternative of doing either forced labour in the Reich or police duty. Of the 15,000, only some entered the battalions. It cannot be determined whether the rest were taken to Germany. This is unlikely, because at that time there were no scheduled deportations to forced labour, and also because volunteer recruitment was still carried out in 1942.

{51} [As argued above, if these 15,000 Ukrainians did not join the schutzmannschaft, they were either sent to Germany or remained incarcerated or were shot. It is inconceivable that the Germans would have released them on their own recognizance.]

This leads to the conclusion that the Higher SS and Police Leader [HSSPF] and the local authorities were supported by Ukrainian helpers in establishing the Militia battalions in Kyiv.

How can the Respondent"s comments be reconciled with these circumstances? Prior to the occupation of the Bukovina [Bukowina] by the USSR, R. was a Romanian citizen and a member of the Ukrainian minority. When the Wehrmacht ended the one-year Soviet rule in the summer of 1941, R. was barely 20 years old. As a non-Romanian and as a Ukrainian activist, he joined a volunteer unit whose aim was to act as a Ukrainian force to bring about an independent Ukraine. For that reason, this organization of Southwest Ukrainians marched for 3 months to Kyiv, where upon its arrival in November/December 1941 it was housed in former barracks of the USSR security forces. The trident flag was unfurled, which the German side did not allow.

[The testimony of Mr. Messerschmidt below is both troubling and puzzling. First of all, it is a historical fact that the Germans did, indeed, incarcerate, torture and shoot Ukrainian nationalists. Even poetess Olena Teliha was shot in Kyiv.

Secondly, we note that Mr. Messerschmidt is acting as a full member of the prosecution team -- presumably having participated in some interview, referring to Mr. Katriuk as the Respondent, and acting as judge and jury in his submission.]

No one mentioned that the leading Ukrainian officers in Kyiv were executed by the Germans, although questions about the instructors [Instrukteure] were raised during the interview [Vernehmung]. With this claim, R stands alone. Such action on the German side would be in contrast to the fact that the commander, the company heads [Kompaniechefs] as well as the platoon and group leaders [Zug - und Gruppenführer] in Battalion 118 were Ukrainians. In my opinion, R"s statements must be seen in connection with his position and role in the battalion. In contrast to the Ordnungsdienst unit (910 men) made up of Ukrainian prisoners of war released in Minsk, where the question of finding suitable Ukrainian leaders could not be solved, such complaints did not become known about Battalion 118. Obviously the German supervisory officers [Aufsichtsoffiziere] appointed by Decree [Erlaß] of Reichsführer SS [RFSS] of 6 November 1941 were fully satisfied with the performance and attitude of their Ukrainian comrades. R. was a Group Leader [Gruppenführer] in Platoon 1 [1.Zug] of Company 1 [1.Kompanie]. The company consisted primarily, or almost completely of Western Ukrainians. It was the best armed and can be described as the elite of the battalion. In his Group [Gruppe], R. was in charge of 10-12 men.

These indications do not fit into the picture of forced service which was painted by R. He does not mention at all that he served in Company 1 and that he was awarded a medal for his activities.

[52]    Then Dr. Messerschmidt addresses the field of operation of Battalion 118 [in Belarus].

[... material deleted ...]

{52} [This material in sections 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 refers to German military actions against partisan activity in Belarus from March to August of 1943 and attempts to implicate Battalion 118 (and, by association, Mr. Katriuk) in atrocities against the civilian population of Belarus.]

[57]    The picture painted by Dr. Messerschmidt is quite different from the story related by Mr. Katriuk. It will be recalled that Mr. Katriuk testified that his company had never participated in any major military operation. Mr. Katriuk also testified that, in Pleshchenitsi and Evye, he had not fired his gun. Further, Mr. Katriuk reiterated in his testimony what he stated in paragraphs 13, 17 and 18 of his statement in response to the Minister"s summary of facts and evidence. He added that, while in Minsk for three to four weeks, Battalion 118 underwent training exercises every day. Mr. Katriuk related the same story in regard to Battalion 118"s presence in Pleshchenitsi, that the battalion underwent training exercises every day and that it guarded its barracks and a bridge on the main road. The battalion would have remained in Pleshchenitsi for two to three months and would never have left town.

[58]    In Evye, Battalion 118, according to Mr. Katriuk, was housed in a school where the men were packed as "herrings in bunk-beds". Battalion 118 patrolled the town to show the population that it was there to protect them from the enemy.

[59]    I will now contrast Mr. Katriuk's testimony with that of Mr. Khrenov. Mr. Khrenov joined Battalion 118 in 1942. He was in the third platoon of the first company of Battalion 118. He remembers Mr. Katriuk was a member of the first company. He also remembers that Mr. Katriuk was from Western Ukraine. Mr. Khrenov confirmed Mr. Katriuk's testimony that, while in Kyiv, Battalion 118 underwent training. He also remembered that the battalion had participated in an operation against partisans outside Chernigov. He added, however, that as things turned out, the first company had not been involved in the fighting.

[60]    Mr. Khrenov then testified that the battalion had been transferred to Minsk, either at the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943. He testified that in Minsk, the battalion underwent training. He could not remember how long the battalion had remained in Minsk. He remembered that the battalion was transferred from Minsk to Pleshchenitsi some time in 1943. He remembered celebrating Christmas of 1942 in Pleshchenitsi. When asked in cross-examination whether his company had been involved in military action while in Pleshchenitsi, Mr. Khrenov answered "of course".

[61]    Mr. Khrenov explained that the first company "wasn"t always involved in things in its entirety. Sometimes, it would be involved as a platoon or as a unit". He then added that it was difficult to remember "all these things".

[62]    He testified that he had participated in the burning of the village of Chmelevisci. When asked whether Mr. Katriuk had participated in this operation, he answered that he could not say but that he could say that the company "was there".

[63]    Mr. Khrenov also testified with respect to an incident which occurred on the road between Pleshchenitsi and Logoisk. A member of the battalion had been killed while repairing telephone lines. The first company was sent to the site of the incident. Mr. Khrenov stated that he saw dead bodies lying on the ground. Mr. Khrenov also saw woodcutters being escorted by the third platoon.

[64]    Mr. Khrenov remembers leaving the Pleshchenitsi region in the summer of 1943 "for some big operation". The battalion then went to Novogrudok. In the fall of 1943, the company went to Evye, where a number of operations were carried out. He remembers fighting partisans near the village of Morino. Mr. Khrenov remembers Mr. Katriuk as being the Commander of the first unit of the first platoon of the first company. When asked how he would describe the way Mr. Katriuk behaved during operations, Mr. Khrenov answered the following7:
Q.     And meaning he [Katriuk] was at what, the vanguard of the advancement?

A.     Well, for instance, there was an incident when he brought a partisan to the battalion where - to the place where the battalion was deployed. Then, they formed up the company in one line. And this partisan, walked along the line to recognize faces of certain people. And he recognized two (2) people, who had wanted to make contact with the partisans. And the man that Katriuk brought recognized two (2) individuals. And then, those two (2) individuals were taken away.

Q.     So, it was Mr. Katriuk who brought this person in to identify the others?

A.     Yes.

Q.     How was Mr. Katriuk viewed by his men?

A.     Well, there were always good relations. They were all fellow countrymen, and they were all friends.

Q.     Okay, in respect of the manner in which he proceeded during the operations, how was his attitude towards fighting?

A.     I didn"t go with him at all, never, but, in general, I can say he was an active participant, but, personally, I had no contact with him.

Q.     During the fighting.

A.     Well, as I said, I was always with the cannon. So we didn"t participate.

Q.     Finally, did anybody in the first company ever get medals or awards?

A.     About seventy percent (70%), not less than seventy percent (70%) of the people in the first company got awards sometime in the spring of 1944, and he also got an award.

Q.     He being?

A.     Katriuk.

Q.     Mr. Katriuk.

A.     He was also given an award.

{64} [It is rather amusing how the prosecution and Judge Nadon attempt to cast negative aspersions against Mr. Katriuk for having been awarded a medal. Medals are a very common public relations exercise within the military establishments throughout the world. It is a very cheap way to express appreciation to the "human cannon fodder" for carrying out dangerous and dehumanizing tasks. We note that Judge Nadon NEVER refers to the medal and supporting certificate presented by the French military to Mr. Katriuk in appreciation for his bravery in fighting against the Germans in France.]

[65]    To complete Mr. Khrenov"s testimony, I should state that he was also part of the battalion created from the remains of Battalions 115 and 118 which was sent to France and from which a number of men defected to the FFL in 1944. In contrast to Mr. Katriuk, Mr. Khrenov did not join the FFL and, as a result, returned to Russia. After being tried, he was found guilty of being a traitor to his country and was sentenced to be executed. After two months on "death row", Mr. Khrenov"s sentence was converted to twenty years of forced labour. After having served thirteen years in prison, Mr. Khrenov was released. He explained that Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine were the ones that returned to Russia. The Western Ukrainians did not return. They remained in France.

{65} [If Mr. Katriuk had returned to Ukraine, Mr. Katriuk's fate would have been rather similar to that of the ethnic Russian, Mr. Khrenov. Except that Ukrainian Nationalists were viewed with even more disfavor. And in the concentration camps scattered across the vast Gulag Archipelago as documented so well by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the survival rate of Ukrainians was substantially less than that of ethnic Russians.]

[66]    In view of the evidence of Dr. Messerschmidt and Mr. Khrenov, I find it difficult, if not impossible, to accept Mr. Katriuk's evidence that he did not participate in any important military operation while his battalion was in Belarus. That is simply not plausible. I find that Mr. Katriuk must have participated in at least some of the operations in which his battalion was involved between 1942 and 1944. Mr. Katriuk was an active member of the battalion and was in charge of one unit of platoon number 1 of company 1. Mr. Khrenov remembers him as an "active participant". I can only conclude that Mr. Katriuk, as a member of Battalion 118, took part in the operations in which his company was involved and, as a result, was certainly engaged in fighting enemy partisans.

[67]    Although I have no difficulty concluding that Mr. Katriuk participated in the operations in which his company was involved, I am not prepared, on the evidence before me, to conclude that he participated in the commission of atrocities against the civilian population of Belarus. Not enough is known to reach any conclusion. The Minister did not call any witnesses, save Mr. Khrenov, with respect to the events on which Dr. Messerschmidt relies in coming to his conclusions. The Minister called Mr. Khrenov but his evidence does not support the Minister"s contention that Mr. Katriuk committed atrocities or participated in the commission of atrocities against the civilian population of Belarus. Consequently, I am of the view that Dr. Messerschmidt"s expert evidence is not sufficient to support the conclusion which the Minister seeks. Dr. Messerschmidt is an expert historian. He relies, like Dr. Golczewski, on a number of documents in order to reach his conclusions. However, Dr. Messerschmidt, it goes without saying, has no personal knowledge of the events which he relates in his report. It would be unthinkable, in my view, to conclude, on the basis of Dr. Messerschmidt"s evidence only, that Mr. Katriuk committed war crimes. I therefore find that the Minister has not proved, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Katriuk participated in the commission of war crimes or that he committed such crimes. The Minister did not call any witnesses who could link Mr. Katriuk to the atrocities committed against the civilian population.

[68]    I now turn to the issue of whether Mr. Katriuk "voluntarily" joined Battalion 118. Both Drs. Golczewski and Messerschmidt are of the view that Mr. Katriuk must have voluntarily joined Battalion 118. At page 31 of his report, Dr. Golczewski recognizes that refusal to join the Militia could lead to "hunger and material dearth". He dismisses Mr. Katriuk's evidence that the only alternative to joining a battalion was deportation to Germany because "deportation or forced labour on a non-voluntary basis started only later in 1942". According to Dr. Golczewski, joining a battalion "was not the only solution. It was a more expedient one". Dr. Messerschmidt is, for slightly different reasons, also of the view that Mr. Katriuk voluntarily joined Battalion 118.

[69]    As I indicated earlier, Mr. Katriuk testified that joining a battalion was the only alternative to being deported to Germany. In that respect, I have already referred to the evidence of Messrs. Serbyn, Hiltschuk and Khrenov.

[70]    This issue is not easy to decide. For those of us who did not participate in the Second World War, or for that matter in any war, it is almost impossible to imagine the difficult choices men and women had to make during the course of that war. In the circumstances which prevailed at that time, "voluntary service" may well have been a relative term. As Professor Golczewski himself recognizes, there were many reasons why a man could have decided to join a battalion. To name a few, deportation, hunger, possible death, etc.. It must be remembered that Professor Golczewski"s opinion is all encompassing. All those who joined the battalions, save for prisoners of war like Mr. Khrenov, did so voluntarily. That cannot, in my view, possibly be true. No doubt many men did join the battalions of their own free will. It cannot also be doubted that many did not join of their own free will but did so either to avoid deportation, hunger or perhaps death. When asked by counsel for Anne McLellan why he did not leave Battalion 118, Mr. Katriuk answered by saying "where could we go? To the Red Partisans, or maybe to the Polish Partisans?".

{70} [It must be remembered that, in Belarus, Mr. Katriuk was in hostile territory. In certain parts of Ukraine, Mr. Katriuk would, at least, have had a theoretical chance of deserting and trying to reach the UPA.]

[71]    It is interesting to compare the statements made by Drs. Golczewski and Messerschmidt with those that are made by Professor Subtelny in his book Ukraine A History. At pages 471 to 473, under the heading Collaboration, Professor Subtelny writes:
Collaboration     In dealing with the Nazis, the Ukrainians had two alternatives: to obey or to resist. As throughout all of German-occupied Europe, the vast majority chose obedience. And when obedience went beyond the limits of the passive fulfillment of German commands, it usually became collaboration. In Western Europe, where loyalty to one"s state was taken for granted and the Nazis were the one and only enemy, collaboration with the Germans was generally viewed as a form of treason. But in Ukraine, collaboration was a much more complicated issue. It was, first of all, unclear as to how much loyalty Ukrainians owed to Stalin"s regime or to the Polish state that had mistreated them. Who was the primary enemy? Was it the Stalinist system, which inflicted such great suffering in the 1930s, or the Nazi regime, which was currently (but perhaps only temporarily) in power? Finally, given the extreme ruthlessness of both regimes in Ukraine, collaboration was often the price of survival for many Ukrainians.

    For Ukrainians the war posed the problem of how to make the best of what was essentially a no-win situation. From an average individual"s point of view, success generally meant the preservation of one"s life. For Ukrainian leaders and their organizations in German-occupied territories the goal - or rather, the puzzle - was how to preserve Ukrainian interests from both the Nazis and the increasingly stronger Soviets. Distasteful as it was, some Ukrainian leaders decided to side with one totalitarian system in order to withstand the other. Because the Soviets appeared to be the greater long-term threat, almost all Ukrainian organizations in the Third Reich collaborated with the Germans at one time or another, but always to a limited degree and for strictly tactical reasons. As a people without a state of their own, Ukrainians operated from a position of weakness. They were unable to formulate policy or influence events. Consequently, Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis was insignificant compared to that of Germany"s allies. Finally, although there were opportunists, anti-Semites, and ideological fanatics among the Ukrainians, there is no evidence indicating that their number was proportionally greater than among other nationalities.

    On the individual level, collaboration with the Germans usually took the form of participation in the local administration of the German-supervised auxiliary police. Motives for taking such positions varied. In Western Ukraine, where, before the war, Poles had excluded Ukrainians from even the lowest administrative positions, the desire to have at least a minimum of authority in Ukrainian hands and to turn the tables on hated rivals was often a major motive. The need to find employment or to satisfy personal ambitions was, as always, an important consideration. The most notorious form of collaboration was to act as a concentration camp guard. Invariably, guard positions were held by Soviet prisoners of war, who had the difficult choice of accepting the task or perishing in the camps.

    Given the lowly position of Ukrainian collaborators in the Nazi apparatus and the ss monopoly on the actual extermination of Jews, Ukrainian participation in the massacres was neither extensive nor decisive. When it did occur, it usually took the form of auxiliary policemen herding Jews into ghettos. However, there were also many Ukrainians who risked the death penalty by aiding Jews. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was an outstanding example: not only did he shelter hundreds of Jews in monasteries but he also used his sermons to decry the Nazi slaughter of Jews. In 1943 an ss report to Himmler stated that the metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that he had come to consider nazism to be an even greater evil than communism.

    Aside from the abortive interlude between the OUN and the Germans in the early days of the war, the most important case of Ukrainian cooperation with Hitler"s regime on the organizational level was the formation of the ss volunteer Galicia Division. In spring 1943, after the stunning German defeat at Stalingrad, Nazi authorities belatedly decided to recruit non-German "easterners" into their forces. Consequently, Otto Wächter, the governor of Galicia, approached the Ukrainian General Committee (UCC) with a proposal to form a Ukrainian division in the German army. After much debate and despite opposition from the OUN-B, Kubijovych and his associates agreed. Their immediate reason for the creation of such a division was the hope that it might help to improve German treatment of the Ukrainians. The specter of 1917-20 was also extremely influential in persuading the UCC leadership, for Kubijovych and his associates (as well as Metropolitan Sheptytsky himself) were convinced that it was the lack of a well-trained army that had prevented Ukrainians from establishing their own state after the First World War. Realizing that the defeat of Germany was probable, they were determined that this time Ukrainians would not be caught in the ensuing chaos without a regular military force. It should be emphasized that both the Ukrainian organizers of the division and its members were motivated primarily by patriotic and anti-Soviet motives, not by pro-Nazi sympathies.

    In the negotiations leading up to the formation of the division, the UCC insisted that the unit fight only against the Soviets. Wächter, on Himmler"s instructions, demanded that the entire higher divisional command be German and, in order not to irritate Hitler, that the division be called Galician rather than Ukrainian. When the UCC called for volunteers in June 1943, over 83,000 men responded. Of these, 13,000 eventually became members of the ss Volunteer Galicia Division.

    The men of the Galician Division were not the only Ukrainians in Hitler"s armies. Scattered among the approximately 1 million former Soviet citizens who wore German uniforms in 1944 were about 220,000 Ukrainians (most of the others were Russians). To put these numbers into perspective, it should be remembered that about 2 million Ukrainians fought on the Soviet side and that large numbers also fought in Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Czech, American, and Canadian forces. Such was the fate of a stateless people.

[72]    There is no evidence that Mr. Katriuk, prior to August of 1944, made any attempt to leave Battalion 118. This, in any event, would be most surprising since leaving the battalion might have been considered to be desertion and would perhaps have resulted in the firing squad. On the other hand, a man could leave to join the partisans and fight against Germany which, in the end, is what Mr. Katriuk did in August of 1944 when he and others joined the FFI.

[73]    On the evidence before me, I cannot accept Mr. Katriuk's evidence that refusal to join Battalions 115 and 118 necessarily meant deportation or forced labour. Rather, I am of the view that Mr. Katriuk joined the battalions for a number of reasons, possibly including better living conditions and avoiding hunger. Another possible reason for joining a battalion was that Ukrainians, at least for a short period of time, preferred the Germans to the Russians and were prepared to fight against their former oppressors. In the end, I must agree with Dr. Golczewski that Mr. Katriuk decided that joining a battalion was the lesser evil of the choices that life was offering him at that time. In reaching this conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I do not believe that Mr. Katriuk was entirely candid in relating his participation in Battalion 118. He clearly was not prepared to answer fully the questions put to him regarding his participation in Battalion 118 and, more particularly, in company number 1 of that battalion. In my view, he was only prepared to testify with respect to generalities and not to specifics. This does not, however, lead me to infer that Mr. Katriuk was trying to conceal that he had committed or participated in the Commission of war crimes. As I indicated earlier, Anne McLellan did not adduce any evidence, other than that of the expert historians, to prove her allegation that Mr. Katriuk had committed war crimes. In reaching that conclusion, I am perfectly conscious of the fact that the victorious powers, which include Canada, are the ones that decided what collaboration meant and who collaborators were. For reasons which will appear later on, this finding is not, in any event, determinative of the questions which I must answer.

{73} [We are puzzled by the flip-flop in reasoning of Judge Nadon in the above paragraph. Of course, Mr. Katriuk joined the schutzmannschaft as a lesser evil than being a slave labourer in Germany or facing almost certain death in a POW camp. Does Judge Nadon expect that the Germans would have set a bunch of Ukrainian Nationalists free?]

COLLABORATOR; COLLABORATE
In Webster's New World Dictionary (1959), we find the following definition:
collaborator, a person who works with another or others, as in writing a book
collaborate, 1. to work together: especially in reference to literary, artistic, or scientific work
2. to co-operate with the enemy; be a collaborationist

Normally, the term collaborator, suggesting that people are working together, does not carry a negative connotation. I doubt that the second definition of collaborate, to co-operate with the enemy, appeared in dictionaries prior to 1939. That definition appears to have been coined in the aftermath of WWII. In fact, in the documents from the post-war period presented by Judge Nadon below, the term collaborator first appears in the July 26, 1948 letter of Superintendent George B. McClelland, RCMP, Ottawa to Major J.A. Wright, RCMP, London. (see section [88]).

But even the definition "to co-operate with the enemy" is subjective and does not necessarily carry a negative connotation. For the enemy obviously views the co-operating person in a positive sense. Furthermore, virtually every person in German-occupied Europe co-operated with the enemy and could, thus, be labelled as a collaborator. For the occupying authority carries the power of life or death over every inhabitant. You either co-operate or you are arrested, incarcerated, tortured and even shot.

Perhaps in Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, one could obtain a general concensus (though no unanimity) as to which of their citizens were collaborators. But in Central and Eastern Europe, especially