Questions Answered:

 

1. Who are the Chetniks?

2. Why were Chetniks abandoned by the Allies?

3. Why the Skull in the flag and the seal?

 


Encyclopedia Britannica, Edition 1986, Micropedia, Vol 3,
Page 182 Entry: CHETNIK
(Quote:)

Cetnik, member of the Serbian nationalist guerrilla force that
formed during WW II to resist Axis invaders and Croatian
collaborators but that primarily fought Tito's Communist
guerrillas, the Partisans. The chetniks were first organized in
Bosnia. Other bands developed in Montenegro, Herzegovina and
Dalmatia, but the most important was the one based in Serbia, LED
BY DRAZA MIHAILOVIC. He directed his forces to avoid large-scale
fighting with the Axis occupation and wait for an Allied invasion
that would liberate Yugoslavia and restore the monarchy... By 1944
the Allies, which have provided Mihailovic with the military
aid... withdrew their support. At the end of war, Chetniks were...
forced from their headquarters at Ravna Gora. Mihailovic and his
few remaining followers were captured by Tito's Partisans (March
1946) and brought to Belgrade, where they were tried and executed.

(end quote)
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CROSS CURRENT

"CHETNIKS: Heroes or Villains?"

By Mike Pavasovic [Mike Pavasovic is a freelance author of NO MEAN CITY- A history of Dirkenfield (Neil Richardson, Manchester, 1984)]

'I wanted nothing for myself. I never wanted the old Yugoslavia back, but I had a difficult legacy'. These were the words of Draza Mihailovic, speaking at his trial in 1946. After his execution, which followed, it was assumed that the last had been heard of the Cetniks. By killing their leader, Tito had completed the total destruction of the Yugoslav royalists.

Almost fifty years on, people are again talking of 'cetniks', but now, as then, the use of the term is erroneous. A cetnik is nothingmore than a guerilla, but the word has become an umbrella, covering every type of Serb nationalist.

Since 1944, it has been generally accepted that Mihailovic and his followers were collaborators, men who preferred cooperation with the Axis to jooining Tito's fight against occupation. It is ironic that just as so much has been done to rehabilitate them- thanks largely to Michael Lees' book THE RAPE OF SERBIA, in which he describes how useful the royalists were to the allies, and how reports of their collaboration were falsified- the term cetnik is coming to be associated with fanatical nationalism.

Contrary to general belief, Mihailovic was not a Serb nationalist. He was commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav army, fighting to
establish a constitutional monarchy. Today's cetniks are a separate group, battling to protect Serb interests as Yugoslavia falls
apart.

The original Cetniks were bands of irregulars raised to protect the Serb population of Macedonia from the Turks, in the years after 1903. There were also cetnik (commando) battalions in the Royal Yugoslav Army. Mihailovic's cetniks should, in fact, be called the Royal Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (Kraljevska Jugoslovenska Vojska u Otadzbini) a body founded on May 13th, 1941.Mihailovic was keen that this should be known and, in 1944, when reorganising the J.V.u.O., announced:'The Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland has done its work under that title. It has never had, nor does it have, the title cetnik, or militia commands'.

A veteran of the Balkan and First World War, Mihailovic was greatly affected by the Toplica Rising of 1917- an operation behind German lines that should have coincided with the breakout from Salonica. It was put down in the most brutal fashion, 35,000 being killed and, to Mihailovic, it proved the futility of guerilla forces taking on regulars head to head, and bred in him a determination that civilians should be spared as much suffering as possible.

Although Mihailovic emerged as King Peter's minister for war, he was only one of several nationalist resistence leaders in 1941. Groups sprang up all over Yugoslavia, often having nothing to do with him in the first instance. Some groups were formed to defend Serbs from the Croat Ustase, others to protect a particular village. It took Mihailovic a year to win their allegiance.

Survival was the motivating force. Both Mihailovic and Tito expected Germany to be defeated and knew the real struggle was for who would rule after the Allied victory. That was what mattered, and all the sides involved were prepared to make
accommadations if necessary.

In WARTIME Milovan Djilas gives an account of the talks between the Partisans and the Germans at Gornji Vakuf in 1943. For certain concessions, they agreed to join forces with the Nazis to combat the Allies if landings were attempted.

In Dalmatia and Montenegro, and in accordance with British policy that they should ensure civilians were not subjected to reprisals,many Cetniks made deals with the Italians- sometimes to protect themselves from the Ustase, sometimes to help them fight the Communists.

Opinion varies as to how much Mihailovic knew or approved of what some of his commanders did, but his control of th JVUO was tenuous, and it was difficult for him to entend his authority far beyond his headquarters. Some, like Kosta Pecanac, one of the pre-1914 Cetnik leaders, were loyal to King Peter but never accepted Mihailovic as commander-in-chief. Pecanac, leading a force of 3,000 in Southern Serbia, felt that he, as a man with forty years service, was senior to Mihailovic.

Mihailovic also had to contend with commanders like Dobrosav Jevdjevic. They paid lip-service to him while doing as they liked. The divlji cetnici (wild cetniks) were bandits who exploited conditions to loot and rob.

As resistence began, it was not long before the differing attitudes of Tito and Mihailovic stared to emerge. The nazis were exacting a terrible price in reprisals, murdering 100 Serbs for every German killed, and fifty for every German wounded. Each leader had his own ideas about how to respond.

Not having the weapons to take on the Axis, and feeling it was wrong to subject the population to atrocities, Mihailovic withdrew into the mountains to await British landings.

Bill Hudson, in the BBC programme about the Special Operations Executive (SOE) THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD,
broadcast in September 1984, recounted Mihailovic's comments:

I do not want irresponsible action against the germans, I want action such as we can defend. I dont want to do as the communistsdo- light a fire here, kill a policeman there- and then run away and leave the local population to have their villages burned and their men killed at the rate of 100 to one.

Hudson added:

Morning and night was the most devastating atmosphere. You'd hear the wailing, the jadikovanje, the wailing lamentation for the dead. This had a strong effect on Mihailovic. He felt his job was to defend the people, to be the shield rather than the sword, whereas Tito felt he must attack and not give a damn about reprisals.

Today's 'cetniks' would claim to have inherited this torch. Whereas many portray them as terrorists, they insist they are protecting the Serbs in the same way that Mihailovic did.

Time has done little to blur the memory of Ustase atrocities. Strange as it may seem to Westerners, the actions of Ante Pavelic's men are still a cause for genuine concern. The wound remains raw and deep, and the Serbs, rightly or wrongly, fear for their people within an independent Croatia. Insisting they will not allow new suffering at Croat hands, they have recommenced battle in the killing fields of fifty years ago.

The royalists give the date of the start of the original civil war as November 2nd, 1941, claiming that the JvuO was attacked by
Communists and that they were compelled to retaliate. The Partisans have a different story but, whatever happened, both sides
viewed the proceedings with some relief.

The basic Cetnik unit at that time was the trojka, comprising three men. Fifteen to twenty trojkas made up a ceta, three ceta a
battalion, and three battalions a brigade - about 500 men.

In the autumn of 1942 corps were created consisting of 3 to 5 brigades. By the end of 1943, the average strength of a corps in
western Serbia was about 3,000 men, not counting support units.

The number of corps was: Serbia, thirty seven; Stari Ras, two; Montenegro, six; Eastern Bosnia and Hercegovina, ten; western Bosnia, three; northern and southern Serbia, one. These were organised into eleven groups of corps, plus the Dinarska Division, and these into commands.

In December, 1944, Mihailovic unveiled plans to reorganise the JVUO into three armies- Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia - and the Group of Moslem Corps. General Miodrag Damjanovic was also appointed his second in command, but the re-organisation was never properly effected because of the invasion of the Red Army and the German withdrawal.

Mihailovic also had followers in the Serbian National Guard, a body founded in February, 1942, and placed under the command of the puppet government of General Milan Nedic. Nedic is often condemned as a collaborator, but the Cetniks maintain he was only trying to do his best for his country.

On April 30th, 1941, the Germans formed a provisional government in Serbia under the leadership of Milan Acimovic, a former Yugoslav minister of the interior. Near normality existed until the German invasion of the USSR. The subsequent actions of the Partisans caused the Germans to worry that law and order would collapse in a critical strategic area. On August 29th, Nedic, a former minister of war, was made minister president of a government of national salvation.

He tried to avoid the job but the Germans threatened that their only alternative would be to bring in the Croats, Bulgarians, and
Hungarians to keep order. Nedic was well aware of the atrocities committed by the Ustase, and was genuinely concerned that the Serbs might be exterminated. He asked for a force of 50,000 men to help him keep the peace, but he was forced to rely on his own units. Even these worried the Germans and they replaced them with the Serbian national Guard, a 15,000 strong body. Those who served in the SNG claim that 95 percent of its members were loyal to Mihailovic and aided the cause by aiding SOE officers, supplying weapons, and generally turning a blind eye when necessary.

Besides his soilders, Mihailovic had a political advisory body, the Central National Committee, which acted as a legislature and judiciary in the liberated territories. One of its members, Ziuko Topalovic, leader of the Yugoslav Socialist Party, organised the Congress of St Sava, held at Ba in the Suvobor Mountains, Serbia in January, 1944, and attended by delegates from all over the country.

Mihailovic has often been termed an 'ultra serb' but that label is not borne out by his comments at the congress, or the resolutions adopted. In his statement at the opening, he said:

With the utmost vigour I refute all suggestions, whereverr they may come from, that the army, and I personally, have any
dictatorial intentions...

In addition, our laws are sufficent guarantee that right will be satisfied. Because of that, the innocent cannot suffer. They will
recive protection from me, personally, and from the army. We will not tolerate any unilateral initiatives.

The congress made seven resolutions. They were undoubtedly anti-communist, but there was no suggestion that Communism
should be banned after the war or that Yugoslavia should become a Greater Serbia. Instead, the resolutions called for a federal state with political and cultural rights for all citizens. Peter Karadjordjevic was to be the constitutional monarch until such a time as a freely elected national assembly chose to remove him.

The end of the JvuO began with the Italian surrender in 1943. Their troops gave themselves to the Partisans who, consequently became far better equipped than Mihailovic;s men. British supplies, never on a grand scale, stopped while supplies to the Communists were increased. In March, 1944, British liason officers were withdrawn.

Yet, on September 1st, Mihailovic announced a general mobilisation, believing Allied landings were imminent. Soon, however,
ammunition began to run out, and after initial successes against the Partisans, the JvuO sustained heavy losses. Frozen, and
ravaged by typhus, some retreated northward into Italy, but most - an estimated 90,000 - died in Bosnia.

Sir Julian Amery, who held a senior position in the SOE in Cairo, commented in the SWORD AND THE SHIELD:

When we saw that the Russians were going to liberate Yugoslavia we had to drop Mihailovic but, instead of saying 'this is
realpolitik, you're very welcome to come out' - we did invite him out - we justified changing sides by branding his supportors as fellow travellers of the nazis which they never were.

Incredibly, Mihailovic survived for more than a year after the Communist takeover. He remained in Yugoslavia throughout, and
refused to flee, quoting Danton 'You cannot carry your country with you on the soles of your shoes'.

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Transcript of a speech delivered by Vladimir Predavec, an ethnic Croatian, and a member of the Central National Committee of Mihailovich's "Chetnik" Forces. It should also be noted that he was the son of the 1st Vice President of the "Croat Peasent Party".

Dec. 19, 1943

"As a Croat, I thank you, General Mihailovic, for your three great achievements.

Firstly, for having preserved the Yugoslav ideal among the Serbs even after it had been stained by the blood of 700,000 Serb martyrs who were slain by the Ustase terrorists. It was you who had the boldness to hoist the Yugoslav colors at Ravna Gora under the most difficult circumstances, and at a time when many Serbs thought that reconciliation could never be possible between them and Croats.

Secondly, for having refused to preach the principle of vengence against the Croats, demanding instead the punishment only of those who were guilty of the crimes comitted.

Thirdly, for having taken, in the name of all Yugoslavs, an energetic attitude to defend democracy against dictatorship of every kind, whether it come from the right or the left."

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[Excerpt from historian David Martin's book "Web of Disinformation"]

One year after Moscow had launched it's campaign of character assasination against Mihailovic, the bulk of the Allied press was parroting Radio Free Yugoslavia's treatment of Mihailovic. It had downgraded him to the status of a collaborator and was singing paeans to the martial virtues of the Communist side in the Yugoslav civil war. For all practical purposes, by October 1943, Tito had become the monopolistic beneficiary of the greatly augmented allied support that had become logistically possible after the collapse of Italy.

This switch in Allied policy is one of the great mysteries of World War II - all the more so because some thirty-odd British officers and seven American officers who were attached to the Mihailovic forces for quite long periods of time are convinced that a grave injustice was done, and that much of the intelligence that led to the switch was false or exageratted.

The Communists have made much of the fact that on November 11, 1941, Mihailovic and three of his colleagues met with a German delegation headed by Lt. Col. Kogard, in the town of Divci. According to the Communists, this was the beginning of Mihailovic's collaboration with the Germans.

At his trial in Belgrade in summer of 1946, Mihailovic admitted that he had met with the Germans and said that he had refused their request that he surrender unconditionally. Fortunately, there exists in German war records a stenographic account of this meeting, according to which Mihailovic told Kogard: "I am neither a communist nor do I work for you. But I have attempted to alleviate and hinder your terror...[the communists] wish to see the greatest possible number of Serbs killed in order to ensure their own later success. No agreement can be made with them. My only purpose [in dealing with them] was to temper their terror, which is as terrible as the German terror. At this moment, innocents are suffering from the terrorist acs of both of you. ... As a soldier, I am not ashamed to be a nationalist. In this capacity I will serve only my people...It is our duty as soldiers not to surrender as long as we can fight. Therefore, you cannot reproach us for not surrendering...I intend to continue the fight against the Communists which began on October 31...we need ammunition. This need brought me here...the Communists have an ammunition factory and ammunition dumps in Uzice. I ask you in the interest of the Serbian people, as well as in your own interest, to supply me , if possible, with ammunition this very night...Otherwise, if I am not given any ammunition, the communists will again obtain sway over Serbia."

To this, Kogard replied that his only instructions were to ask Mihailovic if he was ready to capitulate unconditionally. Obviously disappointed by Kogard's reply, Mihailovic said,"I do not see any sense in your invitation to come to the meeting if this is all you had to say."

Let us consider some other evidence basic to an appreciation of Mihailovic's and the German's attitude toward each other.

Colonel Bailey, an officer of outstanding ability who spoke fluent Serbo-Croat, said in a letter to the editor of the London Times of August 6, 1971, "I do believe that everything must now be done to give Mihailovic his rightful, honourable place in history. He and his Cetniks did more than is generally appreciated for the Allied cause."

An even more impressive appreciation of the role played by Mihailovic - this one from an enemy point of view - was written by General Reinhard Gehlen, head of German military intelligence for Eastern Europe, in a top secret memorandum underscored the truly remarkable success Mihailovic had in rebuilding his organization since his forces were defeated and dispersed by the Germans in December 1941. It read: "Among the various resistence movements which increasingly cause trouble in the area of the former Yugoslav state, the movement of General Mihailovic remains in the first place with regard to leadership, armament, organization, and activity...the followers of DM come from all classes of the population and at present comprise about 80 percent of the Serbian people. Hoping for the liberation from the 'alien yoke' and for a better new order, and an economical and social new balance, their number is continuously increasing. "

There are numerous examples of similar statements by members of the German General staff and, for that matter, by Hitler himself. ON February 16, 1943, exactly one week after the date of General Gehlen's memorandum, Hitler wrote to Mussolini, urging the Italians to terminate their accomadations with certain Cetnik commanders in peripheral areas.

Intercepts did indeed exist, proving the existence of temporary regional understandings between the Germans and the border areas where Partisan and Mihailovic forces confronted each other. (In Serbia proper, where Mihailovic strength was overwhelming, and where the home army did not have to fight a war of survival against the unrelenting attacks of Partisan armies, accomodations with the Germans were a minor rarity.) But it is impossible to establish the relative significance of these intercepts without at the same time considering the unequivocal statements repeatedly made by Hitler and his senior staff officers.

Six weeks after the Gehlen memorandum was written, there took place an incident that throws a new light on the charge that Mihailovic was collaborating with the enemy. In March 1943, Tito sent to the HQ of the German commander in Chief at Sarajevo a delegation consisting of Milovan Djilas, General Koca Popovic, and Dr. Vladimir Velebit, three of the top leaders of the Tito movement. The ostensible purpose of the meeting was to arrange for a prisoner exchange. The three Partisan leaders were subsequently flown by a special German military plane to Zagreb, where the discussions were continued. Walter Roberts, who discovered this interesting documentation in German Military archives, summarized as follows: "The Partisan delegation stressed that the Partisans saw no reason for fighting the German army-they added that they fought against the Germans only in self defense- but wished solely to fight the Cetniks...That they would fight the British should the latter land in Yugoslavia...inasmuch as they wanted to concentrate on fighting the Cetniks, they wished to suggest respective territories of interest. "

The agreement was finally vetoed by Ribbentrop at the end of March, even though Kasche, the German minister in Zagreb, argued passionately that the agreement was to the German's advantage, and that "in all of the negotiations with the Partisans to date, the reliability of Tito's promises had been confirmed."

Kasche's language obviously implied that he was speaking not of one or two prior agreements, but at least three or four- or more, and the question naturally arises : If the Mihailovic forces were regarded as allies of the Germans, why should the Germans have entered into written agreements with the Partisans directed against these forces?

According to professor Mark Wheeler, rumors of the Partisan-Nazi talks quickly reached Mihailovic, though the scope of the agenda was unknownto him at the time. Within ten days of the meeting, Col. Bailey, who had taken over from Hudson as chief of the British mission to Mihailovic months earlier, signaled SOE Cairo with the news. However, this news of Partisan-German collaboration seems never to have reached London. Nor does London appear to have recieved the many references to Partisan initiatives in waging civil war that figured in the dispatches of the BLO's with Mihailovic. At least, there is no reference to those matters in either HInsley's or Foot's histories, or in the Foreign Office files.

As late as August 22, 1944, Hitler displayed his unrelenting hostility toward Mihailovic. On that date he warned Hermann Neubacher, his representative in Belgrade, and Field Marshall Maximilian von Weichs that "the armament of the Cetniks is out of the question." General Albert Jodl summarized Hitler's point of view as follows: "A Serbian army must not be allowed to exist. It is better to have some danger from Communism"

According to Mihailovic's statement at his trial, he had one further meeting, in November 1944, with Herr Starker, who represented Neubacher. Starker said that they had recieved a report that Mihailovic wished to place himself at the service of the Germans. He asked whether this was true. To this, Mihailovic replied: "We were and still are enemies, it is a sad coincidence that I am, like you, fighting against the Partisans. This is a sad coincidence that I regret."

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+++

Those of us who know the real circumstances in Serbia are enraged at the unfair attacks on the Cetniks and their leaders. If only someone could open the poor blind eyes of the spoiled American public, a wonderful group of people might recieve their due recognition. Unfortunately, those of us who lived with these people are few and far between, but believe you me, never will we forget how the men and women of Serbia unquestioningly risked their very lives for us, clothed us, and gave us shelter when they themselves were ill-clad, cold and hungry...I vowed to myself that if I could ever possibly begin to repay these people for all they had done for me, I wouldn't hesitate to do so. Unfortunately, what little I might be able to do would not even pay the interest on my debt to the Serbian people. I suffer with them in their present plight, and in the injustice rendered to them by the American press as well as the American and British governments.

===End

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The "Chetniks" (aka Royal Yugoslav Army for Defense of the Homeland) of WWII fought under a number of differnet banners/flags/emblems. Initially, the flag that they used (and which was considered the "Official" flag) was the Royal Yugoslav tricolours, which had the flag the the Kingdom (blue, white and red stips, with the kingdom seal in the middle). This flag had emblazened on it "For God, King and Country". Another flag used by the forces of Mihailovic was the traditional Serb tricolours (red, blue and white) and the various variants of this (eg. with the nemanjic crest, etc.) The so-called "War Flag" of the Chetniks, was a black flag, with either a plain skull and crossbones or the "Ravna Gora" crest (which itself has the skull and bones) in the middle, surrounded by the emblazened words "With faith in God, for the King and Homeland, Liberty or Death!" The black color was appropriate, as it was the traditional color of mourning for the dead, and at a time of war, the Chetniks were in a constant state of mourning over their loved ones and comrades who had fallen. It was meant to depict the struggle of the warring Chetniks, who would not settle for anything short of victory and freedom...or would die trying. It can be best described by the variant of the Ravna Gora seal known as the "Dinarska Division" emblem from the Chetniks, where the skull is at the bottom of a Cross, at the top of which there is a Crown, and in the middle of which there is a double headed Royal Serbian Eagle. The implication is harkening back to the times of historical past, when the Knez (elevated to Tsar after death) Lazar (or "Prince"/"Duke" Lazar) lead the Serbian forces at Kosovo against the Ottoman Turkish hordes. Legend has it that he was given a choice by God to choose a heavenly kindgom or an earthly one. Lazar, and his soilders, stayed devout to their faith and chose God's heavenly kingdom, for that was the higher prize than that of the mortal realm, and thus fought a curageous and bloody battle against superior forces, but lost. Lazar and many more died, and thus ascended to the "Heavenly Kingdom". The spirit of Kosovo has been embodied in the Serb national character, and is often envoked, especially in dire circumstances, much like the "Remember the Alamo" cry of the American Texans(or the "Dont' Tread on Me; Liberty or Death slogans and mottos of the American Revolution). Thus, on the Dinarska Division emblem, the crown on top is symbolic of the Heavenly Kingdom, the skull at the bottom is death in the mortal state of mankind, and the fighting Serbian Eagle in the middle is depicting the current struggle, inbetween both the heavenly state and the mortal state of death. In that way, the Kosovo spirit is embodied into the Chetnik cause, and the skull emblem is used as the shorthand for this complex formula representing the ultimate battle cry and theme of the Chetnik movement...That they would sacrifice all in the earthly realm to fight for their freedom and their cause, for in death they would ascend to the ultimate victory and freedom of God's heavenly realm.

In the more recent wars of the successor states of the Former "Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia" the black "war flag" of the Chetniks was often seen being hoisted by various Serb military and paramilitary units. In this way, it was an attempt to revive the spirit and fight of 50 years ago into the 1990's. Unfortunately, the meaning of the flag and it's historical significance were often lost among the modern times and people, especially among western journalists reporting the fighting in the Balkans. Thus, many sinister and incorrect meanings were attributed to this flag, and the Chetnik movement as a whole.

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[Written during the Dayton peace talks in 1995]

Rescue remembered

Tipp man uses peace talks as occasion to remember Serb saviors from World War II
By Mary McCarty
Dayton Daily News

Curtis ''Bud'' Diles has a Lincoln Town Car with ''Purple Heart'' vanity plates.

He has a loving 47-year marriage and a comfortable, healthy retirement. He has four children and 12
grandchildren he can barely talk about without busting up with pride.

He has, in short, a full life. The one thing that has eluded him - and consumed him these 51 years - is the
chance to repay the Serb Chetnik soldiers and villagers who saved his life after his bomber was shot down
over Yugoslavia in 1944.

''When you owe your very life to a group of people, you don't forget,'' Diles said of his 50-year quest.

Now, with the peace talks taking place in Dayton, the 70-year-old Huber Heights man hopes the Serb
people can attain the same peace and prosperity they enabled him to enjoy. And he hopes to unload some
of his burden of gratitude.

''For 50 years I've wrestled with an old Underwood, wadding up reams of paper trying to write my story,''
Diles said. ''When I heard the peace talks were coming to Dayton, I thought, maybe now I'll get the
chance to tell my story.''

Diles was one of more than 500 U.S. airmen who owe their lives to Gen. Draza Mihailovich and his
Serbian Chetnik Resistance Army. ''Operation Halyard,'' as it was called, was the largest rescue in history
of U.S. airmen from behind enemy lines. Over a six-month period, U.S. intelligence worked with
Mihailovich to rescue the fliers shot down in the Serbian mountains.

The Chetnik leader was executed by Yugoslav dictator Josip Tito in 1946. The survivors of his rescue
mission, however, have worked tirelessly to preserve his memory. A Tucson-based organization, the
National Committee of American Airmen Rescued by General Mihailovich Inc., has been fighting for
decades to erect a memorial at Arlington National Cemetery.

This week, the group mailed a letter to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, thanking him for his
people's sacrifice during World War II and offering ''heartfelt prayers'' for the peace process.

''Many Serbs were killed in saving American airmen,'' said the organization's president, Maj. Richard
Felman of Tucson. ''Now that they're in trouble, we'd like to do what we can.''

For 18 minutes on Sept. 8, 1944, however, Diles thought he wouldn't make it to see 20.

It was the young airman's 17th mission in three weeks from his base south of Rome. This one was
supposed to be a ''milk run;'' the men were told by intelligence to expect no anti-aircraft fire. ''We thought
we'd drop our bombs and be back in time for supper,'' Diles recalled.

Diles was the nosegunner on a brand-new B-24 bomber that had just bombed its target, a bridge over the
Danube River in Belgrade. Suddenly, anti-aircraft fire burst with a force that shook the entire airplane.

''The bombardier was behind me, and he caught a piece of flak through the nose. All I could see was
blood. I put his hand on his rip cord and shoved him in through the nose hatch. I didn't even know if he
was conscious. I went right behind him.''

As he parachuted 18,000 feet to the ground, swinging wildly in the wind, Diles pondered the Danube
below him - and pondered the different ways he would die.

''When death is a certainty, you don't panic. Even though I was oscillating back and forth, it felt absolutely
still. I wondered: Would the Nazis shoot me down? Would our own plane's propellers chew us up into
hamburger? Would the Serbs or Croatians capture me? We had been told the Serbs would cut our ears off
and give them to the Nazis.''

Diles landed in a cornfield with a force that nearly knocked him out. Almost immediately, he was
surrounded by Serb villagers and soldiers who whisked him away from the German Stuka dive bombers
buzzing the treetops, looking for the plane's crew.

For nine days, his Serb protectors moved Diles and 23 fellow airmen - including six from his nine-man
crew - from farmhouse to farmhouse. A Life magazine photographer snapped them sleeping in a hayloft.

To avoid German patrols, they traveled on horse-drawn carts away from highways and main roads.

''There was plenty of dance and food and song, and each of them treated us like royalty,'' Diles recalls.

The prospect of death was never far away.

''Our closest call came when a German convoy got past the guards and approached our horse-drawn cart.
I heard the Chetnik guard say fini in French, and I thought that meant we were finished. I saw a German
tank with a machine gun mounted in front of the cab, pointed right at us, and I expected them to start
firing.''

But the Germans, who were evacuating Greece, moved on, and ''we all ran into the hills like scared
rabbits.''

Twice the Chetniks found an airfield and radioed for a rescue, and twice they were nearly overtaken by
German troops. Finally, on Sept. 17, two C-47 cargo planes landed in a tiny field north of the town of
Valjevo. In takeoff, one plane hit a haystack; another dragged tree limbs. ''It was touch-and-go,'' Diles
recalled. ''We could hear the machine-gun fire in the background of Serbs fighting off Tito's Partisans,
who were trying to keep us from getting off the ground.''

The men cheered as they crossed the Adriatic Sea, figuring they were ''home free.''

Diles flew 17 more missions before returning to a career as a machine operator in his hometown of
Portsmouth, Ohio. He met his wife, Inez, there. Twenty years ago Diles joined the Techmet Co. in Tipp
City (now LaserMike Inc.), a laser-scanning manufacturing corporation co-founded by his brother Paul.

Over the years, Diles has been pained by the American abandonment of Mihailovich - whom he describes
as a ''Lincolnesque figure'' - as well as the failure to honor his memory.

Diles has tried to do his bit. His correspondence about Mihailovich and letters to Serb people crowd six
feet of shelf space in his study.

''There were 8,000 soldiers assigned to protect Allied servicemen. I believe the Serbians thought the
Americans would come to their rescue when they found out what they'd done. Well, Americans never did
find out. Now it has no meaning; it's ancient history.

''When I heard about the peace talks, I thought, 'Here's a chance for me to get my opinion to someone
who will hear me and listen.'

''After all, I wouldn't be here without the Serbs or Mihailovich. And not only am I here, but my four
children and 12 grandchildren.''

Posted November 12, 1995

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